Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, successorin-interest to Centennial Bank, Inc., and Richard W.
Jones, Trustee v. Gary D. McDonald, Lynnea J.
McDonald, G and L Mac, Inc.; Casey Florence and
Bradford E. Taylor, as Beneficiaries; Chad C.
Shattuck and Stanford A. Graham, as Trustees;
Gray Excavation, Inc. : Addenda
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Sherman C. Young; Dallas B. Young; Ivie & Young; Attorneys for Appellee.
Steven C. Tycksen; Chad C. Shattuck; Tycksen & Shattuck; Attorneys for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. McDonald, No. 20100356 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2320

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, successor-in-interest to
CENTENNIAL BANK, INC., and

:
:

RICHARD W. JONES, Trustee,
Plaintiff7Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
vs.

Case No.: 20100356

GARY D. McDONALD, LYNNEA J.
McDONALD, G&L MAC, INC.; CASEY
:
FLORENCE and BRADFORD E. TAYLOR,
as Beneficiaries; CHAD C. SHATTUCK and :
STANFORD A. GRAHAM, as Trustees;
GRAY EXCAVATION, INC.;
:
Defendants/Appellants.

Oral Argument Requested

:

ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM MEMORANDUM DECISIONS OF
OCTOBER 6,2009 AND DECEMBER 3, 2009
AND JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, JUDGE ROBERT P. FAUST

STEVEN C. TYCKSEN, #3300
CHAD C. SHATTUCK, #9345
TYCKSEN & SHATTUCK, LC
12401 South 450 East, Suite E-l
Draper, Utah 84020
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
Bradford E. Taylor and
Chad C. Shattuck, Trustee

SHERMAN C. YOUNG, #3891
DALLAS B. YOUNG, #12405
IVIE & YOUNG
226 West 2230 North
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorneys for Appellee and
Cross-Appellant
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
RLED
UTAH APPELLATE COUF

mum

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, successor-in-interest to
CENTENNIAL BANK, INC., and
RICHARD W. JONES, Trustee,
Plaintiff/Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
Case No.: 20100356

vs.

GARY D. MCDONALD, LYNNEA J.
MCDONALD, G&L MAC, INC.; CASEY

Oral Argument Requested

FLORENCE and BRADFORD E. TAYLOR,
as Beneficiaries; CHAD C. SHATTUCK and
STANFORD A. GRAHAM, as Trustees;
GRAY EXCAVATION, INC.;
Defendants/Appellants.
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM MEMORANDUM DECISIONS OF
OCTOBER 6,2009 AND DECEMBER 3, 2009
AND JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, JUDGE ROBERT P. FAUST
STEVEN C. TYCKSEN, #3300
CHAD C. SHATTUCK, #9345
TYCKSEN & SHATTUCK, LC
12401 South 450 East, Suite E-l
Draper, Utah 84020
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
Bradford E. Taylor and
ChadC. Shattuck, Trustee

SHERMAN C. YOUNG, #3891
DALLAS B. YOUNG, #12405
IVIE & YOUNG
226 West 2230 North
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorneys for Appellee and
Cross-Appellant
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Table of Contents

ADDENDUM TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAINTIFFS CENTENNIAL BANK, INC. AND RICHARD W. JONES,
TRUSTEE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE VALIDITY AND ENFORCEABILITY
OF THE LIEN OF PLAINTIFFS' DEED OF TRUST

1

BRAD TAYLOR'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF BRAD TAYLOR'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

2

PLAINTIFFS' COMBINED MEMORANDUM IN REPLY AND SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT BRADFORD E. TAYLOR'S CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

3

BRAD TAYLOR'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF BRAD
TAYLOR'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

4

PLAINTIFFS CENTENNIAL BANK, INC. AND RICHARD W. JONES,
TRUSTEE'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM

5

BRAD TAYLOR'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM ON CROSS-MOTIONS
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ADDRESSING THE AFTERACQUIRED TITLE ISSUE)

6

SEPTEMBER 5,2006 PROMISSORY NOTE

7

Tabl

SHERMAN C. YOUNG (3891)
IVIE& YOUNG
226 West 2230 North
P.O. Box 657
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: (801) 375-3000
Facsimile: (801) 375-3067
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Centennial Bank, Inc. and Richard W. Jones, Trustee
IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CENTENNIAL BANK, INC., and
RICHARD W. JONES, Trustee,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

GARY D. MCDONALD, LYNNEA J.
MCDONALD, G&L MAC, INC.; CASEY
FLORENCE, BRADFORD E. TAYLOR as
beneficiaries; CHAD C. SHATTUCK and
STANFORD A. GRAHAM, as Trustees;
GRAY EXCAVATION, INC.;

PLAINHFFS
CENTENNIAL BANK, INC.
AND
RICHARD W. JONES, TRUSTEE'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AS TO THE VALIDITY AND
ENFORCEABILITY OF THE LIEN OF
PLAINTIFFS' DEED OF TRUST

Defendants.

BRADFORD E. TAYLOR,

Consolidated Civil Nos.:
080903426 and 080903653

Third Party Plaintiff,
Judge: Honorable Robert Faust
vs.
RYAN ANDERSEN, and JOHN DOES 110,

COPY JO CLIENT

Third. Party Defendants.
GRAY EXCAVATION, INC., a Utah
corporation, JARED R. GRAY and HEIDI
H. GRAY, BERNARD W. DUTSON,

JAL/TO COURT t U .
ORIGINAL/TO
TVATF

I

AZORA DUTSON, LYMAN DUTSON,
MICHAEL WEIS, LUCIA WEIS, LANE
MYERS, LANE MYERS
I CONSTRUCTION, L.C., and JOHN DOES,
1-25,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CENTENNIAL BANK, INC., GARY
MCDONALD, G&L MAC, INC., RYAN
ANDERSEN, CASEY FLORENCE,
BRADFORD E. TAYLOR, MOUNTAIN
VIEW TITLE AND ESCROW, and JOHN
DOES 1-100, as well as another person or
entity claiming any right, title or interest in
the real property which is the subject of this
action,
j
Defendants.

CENTENNIAL BANK, INC.,
Counterclaimant and Cross-Claimant,
vs.
GRAY EXCAVATION, INC., a Utah
corporation, JARED R. GRAY and HEIDI
H. GRAY, BERNARD W. DUTSON,
AZORA DUTSON, LYMAN DUTSON,
MICHAEL WEIS, LUCIA WEIS, LANE
MYERS, LANE MYERS
CONSTRUCTION, L.C., GARY
MCDONALD, G&L MAC, INC., RYAN
ANDERSEN, CASEY FLORENCE,
BRADFORD E. TAYLOR, MOUNTAIN
VIEW TITLE AND ESCROW, and JOHN
DOES 1-10, as well as another person or
entity claiming any right, title or interest in
the real property which is the subject of this
action.

Counterclaim and Cross-Claim
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
This is an action to quiet title to several subdivision lots located in the city of Riverton, in Salt
Lake County. The properties at issue are Lots 3,4, 5, 8,9,10, 11,12,13,14 and 16 of Plat "A"
McKenzie Park Estates Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof in the Salt Lake County
Recorder's office (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Property"). Record title to the Property is
in the name of Defendant Gary McDonald. At issue in this case are three deeds of trust and five
mechanic's lien claims, all of which were recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office and all of
which claim to be the first and paramount lien upon the Property. The instruments relevant to this action
are as follows and were recorded in the official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder as indicated
below:
•

a Construction Loan Deed of Trust in the amount of $ 1,704,375.00, executed by

Defendant Gary McDonald, individually, in favor of Plaintiff Centennial Bank, Inc., recorded June 2,
2006, as Entry No. 9742028, in Book 9303, at Page 2800 (hereinafter the "Deed of Trust", "Plaintiffs'
Deed of Trust" or "Centennial Bank's Deed of Trust");
•

a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents executed by Defendant R.yan Andersen,

individually, in favor of Defendant Casey Florence, recorded on June 15,2006, as Entry Number
9757188, in Book 9310, at Page 342 (hereinafter the "Florence Deed of Trust");
•

a Deed of Trust with Assignments of Rents executed by Defendant Gary McDonald as

President of G&L Mac, Inc., in favor of Defendant Bradford E. Taylor, recorded on September 6, 2006,
as Entry No. 9836108, in Book 9347, at Page 429 (hereinafter the "Taylor Deed of Trust"); and

•

five claims of mechanic's liens in favor of Lyman W. Dutson, Bernard and Azora

Dutson, and Gray Excavation, Inc., all recorded in September 2007.
At the time of the recordation of the trust deeds at issue in this case, record title to the Property
was in the name of G&L Mac, Inc., Defendant McDonald's corporation. As a consequence, even
though Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust was recorded first, there is an issue with the Deed of Trust which,
through this action, Plaintiff seeks to remedy. As the result of a scrivener's error, Plaintiffs' Deed of
Trust was recorded when record title to the Property was held in the name of G&L, Mac, Inc., Defendant
Gary McDonald's corporation, rather than in the name of Gary McDonald, individually. Stated
otherwise, Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust was executed by Gary McDonald in his individual capacity at a time
when record title to the Property was held in the name of McDonald's corporation. After recognizing
this error, the scrivener who created it attempted to cure the same by recording a Special Warranty Deed
from G&L Mac, Inc. to Gary McDonald on December 22,2006.. In the interim - after the recording of
Plaintiffs Deed of Trust but before the recording of the December 22,2006 Special Warranty Deed - the
Florence Deed of Trust and the Taylor Deed of Trust were recorded.
Among other terms for the loan from Centennial Bank to Defendant Gary McDonald (hereinafter
the "Loan"), Plaintiff and McDonald agreed, Defendant McDonald and the closing agent made
representations to the Bank, and it was the Bank's unambiguous understanding, that the Loan would be
secured by a first lien deed of trust on the Property. It was further understood and agreed that the
proceeds from Plaintiff's Loan would be used to pay off two prior liens, which had priority over all liens
in this case. And, the proceeds of Plaintiff s Loan were in fact used to pay off these prior liens.
Plaintiff asserts a priority over the Florence and Taylor Deeds of Trust based upon three theories:
1) the doctrine of Equitable Subrogation - based upon a representation of a first lien and the fact that
Plaintiffs loan proceeds were in fact used to satisfy two prior liens, 2) the doctrine of Reformation -

based upon the scrivener's error; and 3) the doctrine of After-Acquired Title - based upon U.C.A. § 571-10, and the December 22,2006 Special Warranty Deed.
In reliance upon these theories, Plaintiff seeks partial summary judgment from this Court
decreeing: 1) that Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust is a valid, enforceable lien as against all parties, 2) that the
December 22,2006 Special Warranty Deed is effective as of June 2,2006, the date of the closing of
Plaintiff's Loan to Gary McDonald, and 3) that Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust is prior and superior to the
Florence and Taylor Deeds of Trust in all respects. This motion does not address the priority or .validity
of any of the mechanic's lien claims, as the issues associated with those claims are still in discovery.
Based upon the undisputed facts of record, Plaintiff asserts that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, that the Deed of Trust is a valid enforceable lien upon the Property, which enjoys a
priority over the Florence and Taylor Deeds of Trust.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH NO GENUINE ISSUE EXISTS
Origination of the Loan - Eric Stevenson and Gary McDonald
1.

The events giving rise to this action occurred in April, May, and early June 2006, and

began when Defendant Gary D. McDonald contacted one Mr. Eric C. Stevenson, a mortgage broker in
Roy, Utah. Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, % 7.
2.

In April 2006, Stevenson was employed by Republic Mortgage, as a Senior Mortgage

and Construction Loan Officer, at its Roy, Utah office. Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, ^3.
3.

Stevenson is a licensed loan officer and has been in the mortgage business for twenty-

eight (28) years. Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, 1f1f 2,4.
4.

Over his career, Stevenson has placed approximately one hundred (100) loans for the

acquisition and development of raw land into subdivisions ("A&D loans") in the northern Utah area.
Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, % 5.

5.

These loans were placed with various lenders in northern Utah. Affidavit of Eric C

Stevenson, ^ 6.
6.

In April 2006, Gary McDonald contacted Stevenson. Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, «f 7.

7.

Mr. McDonald was a realtor who owned "Got Your Back Realty" in Salt Lake City.

Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, If 7.
8.

Mr. Stevenson had known Mr. McDonald since about 2004, and had done business with

McDonald previously, having placed approximately twenty-five (25) loans for him. Affidavit of Eric C.
Stevenson, If 8.
9.

McDonald asked Stevenson to once again act on his behalf for the purpose of finding a

loan for the acquisition and development of real property located in Riverton, Utah (hereinafter the
"Loan")- Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, fl 9.
10.

The real property was ultimately subdivided and is described as:
Lots 1-16 of Plat "A" McKenzie Park Estates Subdivision, according
to the official plat thereof recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's
Office as Entry No. 10352916, in Book 2008P, at Page 42.

Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, f 10.
11.

This motion concerns only Lots 3,4, 5, 8, 9,10,11,12,13,14 and 16 of the subdivision.

Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment.
12.

McDonald asked Stevenson if he would package an A&D loan and "shop it around55 for

the best rates. Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, 1f 11.
13.

McDonald agreed that Stevenson would once again act on behalf of McDonald in seeking

and obtaining financing for the project. Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, ^ 12.

14.

Both McDonald and Stevenson understood and agreed that McDonald would have

ultimate control and would make all final decisions concerning the Loan. Affidavit of Eric C.
Stevenson, ^ 13.
15.

McDonald instructed Stevenson to obtain a loan in McDonald's name, individually.

Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, ^f 14.
16.

McDonald instructed Stevenson to obtain a loan that was to be secured by afirstlien

deed of trust upon the Property. Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson,fl15.
17.

Documentation for the Loan had originally been put together by one Lindsay Sinclair

who, for unknown reasons, was not able to place the Loan with a lender. Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson,
UK 16,17.
18.

Mr. Stevenson received the Loan materials, including the Loan application, appraisal, etc.

Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, f 18.
19.

Thereafter, he ordered some additional materials, includingfinancialinformation and a

title commitment. Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, ^[19.
20.

After Stevenson received the title commitment (hereinafter the "Title Commitment"), he

reviewed it to see if there were any existing liens that would preclude McDonald from obtaining the
Loan. Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, If 20,
21.

He concluded that nothing shown on the Title Commitment would prevent McDonald

from getting an A&D loan for the Property. Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, ^ 21.
22.

The basic terms of the Loan that Mr. McDonald had instructed Stevenson to obtain were

as follows: a) McDonald needed to borrow enough money tofinishpaying for the Property and to pay
off all prior encumbrances on the Property, b) the Loan was to be a personal loan, secured by afirstlien
deed of trust on the Property that was to be owned by McDonald, personally, and c) the Loan proceeds

would be used to acquire the Property, clear title to the Property of all liens and encumbrances, and pay
for the subdivision improvements to the Property. Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, U 22.
23.

Based upon his years of experience in the mortgage loan business in the Ogden area,

Stevenson Icnew that no bank in the Ogden area would agree to make an A&D loan unless the banlc was
secured by afirstposition lien. Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, % 23.
24.

Stevenson also knew, based upon his experience, that no banlc in the Ogden area would

agree to make an A&D loan unless the loan was made to the borrower, individually. Affidavit of Eric C.
Stevenson, if 24.
25.

From start tofinish,the tasks undertaken by Stevenson took about two weeks to

accomplish. Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson ^f 29.
Delivery of the Loan Materials to Morris Smith at Centennial Bank
26.

In early May 2006, Stevenson sent the Loan materials to Mr. Morris Smith, a loan officer

at Plaintiff Centennial Bank. Affidavit of Eric C. Stevenson, ^ 25.
27.

The Loan was thefifthor sixth loan Stevenson had done with Centennial Bank and

Stevenson Icnew and understood, based upon his prior experience with Centennial Banlc, that the Banlc
would not make an A&D loan unless the loan was secured by afirstlien. Affidavit of Eric C
Stevenson, f 26.
28.

He also knew, based upon his experience, that Centemiial Bank would not make an A&D

loan to McDonald unless the Property was owned by Mr. McDonald, individually. Affidavit of Eric C.
Stevenson, f 27.
29.

The basic terms of the Loan for which McDonald applied to Centennial Banlc were as

follows: a) Mr. McDonald needed to borrow enough money tofinishpaying for the Property and to pay
off all prior and existing liens upon the Property, b) the Loan was to be a personal loan, secured by a

first lien deed of trust on the Property that was to be owned by Mr. McDonald, personally, and c) the
Loan proceeds would be used to acquire the Property, clear title to the Property of all liens and
encumbrances, and pay for the subdivision improvements to the Property. Affidavit of Eric C.
Stevenson, Tf 28.
30.

Stevenson knew Smith and had done business with Smith for about a year when

Stevenson brought McDonald's loan to Smith. Affidavit of Morris Smith, ^ 4.
31.

At this time, Smith had been employed at Centennial Bank for about ten (10) years.

Affidavit of Morris Smith, ^ 5.
32.

Over his ten years of employment at Centennial Bank, Smith had done about twenty (20)

A&D loans, two of which were with Stevenson. Affidavit of Morris Smith, ^f 6.
33.

As presented by Stevenson and understood by Smith, the basic terms of the Loan were:

a) Mr. McDonald needed to borrow enough money to finish paying for the Property and to pay off
existing liens and encumbrances on the Property which, as it developed, were two in number, one to
Millennia Investment Corporation and another to Cottonwood Assets, b) the Loan was to be a personal
loan, secured by a first lien deed of trust on the Property that was to be owned by Mr. McDonald,
personally, and c) the Loan proceeds would be used to acquire the Properly, clear title to the Property of
all liens and encumbrances, and pay for the subdivision improvements to the Property. Affidavit of
Morris Smith, fl 7.
34.

The Loan package that Stevenson delivered to Smith included, but was not limited to, the

following:
« a title report, Exhibit 1;
•

McDonald's credit information, Exhibit 2.

Affidavit of Morris Smith, fl 8.

35.

Smith analyzed the Loan package based upon the Bank's policy which, in addition to

other criteria, required the following:
• afirstlien to secure the repayment of the promissory note;
• a loan to value ratio of 70%;
• lending to experienced developers only;
• income and employment verification from the borrower; and,
© copies of borrower's tax returns verified by the borrower at closing.
Affidavit of Morris Smith, ^ 9.
36.

When Smith looked at the title report, he saw the two prior liens to Millennia and

Cottonwood and knew they would have to be paid off from Centennial Bank's loan proceeds to ensure
that the Bank's trust deed was afirstposition lien on the Property. Affidavit of Monis Smith, ^f 10.
37.

Smith knew and understood that Bank policy would not permit the Loan unless it was a

personal loan made to McDonald. Affidavit of Morris Smith,fl11.
38.

Smith knew that Bank policy required the Property to be owned by the Bon*ower.

Affidavit of Moms Smith,fl12.
39.

Smith also knew that Bank policy would not permit the Loan unless it was secured by a

first lien deed of trust. Affidavit of Morris Smith, H13.
40.

Smith knew that the Bank would not release funds for the Loan unless the Bank's deed of

trust was a first and paramount lien upon the Property. Affidavit of Morris Smith, ^ 14.
41.

It took Smith about three weeks to compile all of the information necessary for the Bank

to evaluate the Loan. Affidavit of Morris Smith, ^f 15.

42.

When Smith had compiled the information necessary for the Banlc to reach a decision as

to whether to make the Loan, Smith took the Loan to Suzanne Gnehm, the Bank's Assistant Vice
President and Senior Loan Underwriter- Affidavit of Morris Smith, )\ 16.
43.

Ms. Gnehm had authority to make the decision whether the Loan would be submitted to

the Bank's Loan Committee, which had ultimate authority in deciding whether the Bank would agree to
make the Loan to McDonald. Affidavit of Morris Smith, fl 17.
44.

Smith knew that Ms. Gnehm would not present the Loan to the Bank's Loan Committee

unless the Loan satisfied the Bank's policy for A&D loans which included, among others, the following
requirements: a) the Loan had to be a personal loan made to Mr. McDonald, b) the Property that
secured the Loan had to be owned by Mr. McDonald, personally, c) the Loan had to be secured by a first
lien deed of trust, and d) the Bank's policy for A&D loans required the Loan to be secured by a first and
paramount lien, and that the Bank would not authorize the release of the Loan proceeds unless-the
Bank's deed of trust was a first and paramount lien upon the Property owned by Mr. McDonald.
Affidavit of Morris Smith, % 18.
45.

Smith did not take the Loan to Gnehm until it was clear to him that the Loan, as proposed

by Mr. McDonald, satisfied these Bank requirements, including the requirement that it be secured by a
first UQH deed of trust. Affidavit of Morris Smith, ^ 19.
46.

In May 2006, Suzanne Gnehm was Assistant Vice President and Senior Loan

Underwriter for Centennial Bank. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, f 2.
47.

As Senior Loan Underwriter,, she had final authority as to which proposed loans were

presented to Centennial Bank's Loan Committee and which proposed loans were not presented to the
Bank's Loan Committee. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, *[} 3.

Receipt of the Loan Materials by Suzanne Gnehm, the Bank's Loan Underwriter
48.

In May 2006, Gnehm received the Loan package for the Loan to McDonald that had been.

originated by Stevenson. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, If 4.
49.

As represented to the Bank, the Loan was for the acquisition of the Property and for the

development of the Property into a platted subdivision. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm,ffif5,6, and 7.
50.

After she received the Loan package, Gnehm reviewed the Loan as proposed by Mr.

McDonald. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, If 8.
5L

As represented to Gnehm by Stevenson, the basic purpose of the Loan, a) was to pay off

two loans, to Millennia Investment Corporation and Cottonwood Assets, b) was to be a personal loan,
secured by a first lien on the Property located in Riverton, Utah, owned by McDonald, personally, and c)
the Loan proceeds were to be used to acquire the Property, clear title to the Property of all liens and
encumbrances, and pay for the improvements for a subdivision on the Property. Affidavit of Suzanne
Gnehm, 1f 9.
52.

The Loan was to be repaid through the sale of the subdivision lots. Affidavit of Suzanne

Gnehm,fl10.
53.

As presented to Gnehm, McDonald's Loan satisfied the Bank's policy for A&D loans,

which included a requirement that the Bank's lien was to be afirstand paramount lien upon the
Properly. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, Tf 11.
54.

Gnehm knew that it was Bank policy to only acceptfirstposition liens on A&D loans.

Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, If 12,
55.

Gnehm knew that the Bank had a policy of not making A&D loans unless the loan is

secured by afirstlien on the property. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, % 13.

56.

That had always been the Banlc's policy for Gnehm's entire employment history often

(10) years with the Bank. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, ^ 14.
57.

As part of her underwriting process, Gnehm confirmed that McDonald's loan application,

Exhibit 3, was from Gary McDonald, individually. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, *$ 15.
58.

In addition, she carefully examined the credit reports for McDonald, Exhibit 2. Affidavit

of Suzanne Gnehm, ^| 16.
59.

She did so because McDonald was to be the Banlc's borrower and she wanted to be sure

he was creditworthy. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, ^ 17.
60.

Gnehm also examined the Title Commitment and found two liens, one hi favor of

Millennia Investment Corporation and the other in favor of Cottonwood Assets, that already encumbered
the Property. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, ^f 18.
61.

As part of her underwriting process, she required that these two loans be paid off from

the Loan proceeds and the liens released, so that the Banlc's lien would be a first position lien upon the
Property. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, ^f 19.
62.

This requirement is shown on Page 4 of the Loan Presentation, Exhibit 4, as Prior to

Funding Requirement ("PTF") No. 16. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, ^[20.
63.

Gnehm examined the Title Commitment to ensure that Gary McDonald was the

"Proposed Insured Owner" on the Property. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, If 21.
64.

She did so to verify that as the borrower, McDonald was also going to be the owner of

tire Property. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, ^ 22.
65.

Based upon the Title Commitment, she knew that title to Parcel 2 of the Property was

vested in G&L Mac, Inc., McDonald's company and employer. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, % 23.

66.

Because this was an A&D loan, Gnehm knew that McDonald was going to purchase the

Property. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, <§ 24.
67.

As part of this purchase, she knew that at closing a deed would be executed conveying

title to the Property to Gary McDonald, individually. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, ^ 25.
68.

Gnehm knew that at closing McDonald would execute the Centennial Bank Deed of

Trust, Exhibit 5, in his individual capacity, so that the Banlc would have a validfirstlien upon the
Property, Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, ^[ 26.
69.

Gnehm also knew that at closing Mr. McDonald would execute a promissory note

(hereinafter the "Note"), Exhibit 6, in his individual capacity. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnebn, f 27.
70.

When she was satisfied, and only when she was satisfied, that the Loan complied with the

Bank's policy, Gnehm recommended that the Loan be approved. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, K 28.
71.

This occurred on or about May 15,2006. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, Tf 29.
Approval of the Loan by the Bank's Loan Committee

72.

Thereafter, the loan officer, Morris Smith, forwarded the Loan Presentation to the Bank's

Loan Committee. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, ^f 30.
73.

The Loan Committee consisted of Alan Thompson, Scott Priest, Clint Williams, and

Suzanne Gnehm. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, %3\.
74.

The Loan Committee met on May 16,2006 to consider the Loan to Mr. McDonald.

Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, 1f 32.
75.

As is the Bank's practice, Morris Smith, the loan officer, presented the Loan to the

committee. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, % 33.
76.

Gnehm attended the meeting to address any issues that may have come up. Affidavit of

Suzanne Gnehm, ^ 34.

77.

As presented to the Loan Committee, the basic terms of the proposed Loan to Mr.

McDonald were, a) Mr. McDonald needed to borrow enough money to finish paying for the Property
and to pay off existing liens and encumbrances on the Property to Millennia Investment Corporation and
Cottonwood Assets, b) the Loan was to be a personal loan, secured by a first lien deed of trust on the
Property that was to be owned by Mr. McDonald, personally, and c) the Loan proceeds would be used to
acquire the Property, clear title to the Property of all liens and encumbrances, and pay for the
subdivision improvements to the Property. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, Tf 35.
78.

As presented to the Loan Committee, the Loan complied with the Bank's policy,

including the requirements of a first lien deed of trust upon the Property and the requirement that the
Property be owned by McDonald, individually. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, ]\ 36.
79.

The Loan Committee approved the Loan on May 16,2006. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm,

137.
Delivery of (In1 l,u,in ALHniil (oOinyl
80.

DIIMUII I'O

IVquttT For Closing

Subsequently, the Loan Package was sent to Cheryl Driscoll for closing and funding.

Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, 1f 38.
81.

hi May 2006, Cheryl Driscoll was the Loan Closer for Centennial Bank. Affidavit of

Cheryl Driscoll, 1f 2.
82.

After all pre-closing conditions were met and after receiving a loan package from the

Bank's Loan Committee, it was her job to prepare the closing documents, send them to a title company
for closing, receive the loan documents back from a title company after closing, and after reviewing the
executed loan documents and after all pre-funding conditions were met, to fund the loan. Affidavit of
Cheryl Driscoll, 1f 3.

83.

Driscoll was the last Bank employee who saw a loan package before it was sent to a title

company for closing. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, ^f 4.
84.

It was DriscolPs job to protect the Bank by making sure that all pre-closing requirements

had been satisfied before she sent a loan package for closing. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, If 5.
85.

Driscoll was also the last person who saw a loan package after it was returned from a title

company but before a loan-was funded. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, fl 6.
86.

It was her job to make sure that ail pre-fimding requirements for a loan were satisfied

before she authorized funding of a loan. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, If 7.
87.

DriscolPs job was to protect the Bank and to make sure that all requirements of a loan

were satisfied before funding. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, If 8.
88.

She took her job seriously. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, % 8.

89.

In May 2006, she received a loan package for a loan to a Mr. Gary McDonald. Affidavit

of Cheryl Driscoll, 1f 9.
90.

After receiving the Loan Package, she turned to the Loan Presentation (hereinafter the

"Loan Presentation") (Exhibit 4) to determine which, if any, pre-closing and pre-funding requirements
established by Suzanne Gnehm, the Bank's Assistant Vice President and Senior Loan Underwriter, were
still outstanding. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, % 10.
91.

Among other items, Driscoll confirmed that Centennial Bank was the "Proposed Insured"

on the Title Commitment, (Exhibit 1), which was Pre-closing Requirement No. 11 on the Loan
Presentation. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, ^f 11.
92.

She knew that this was a loan for the acquisition and development of raw land into a

subdivision. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, ^ 12.

93.

She knew that it was Bank policy only to accept first position liens on A&D loans.

Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, If 13.
94.

She lcnew that it had always been Bank policy only to accept first liens on A&D loans.

Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, If 14.
95.

To ensure that its loan is secured by afirstlien, it is the Bank's policy to send a "First

Lien Letter" to a title company with the other closing documents, to require the title company to sign the
First Lien Letter, or provide a Closing Protection Letter, and have the title company return one or the
other to the Bank prior to funding. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, Tf 15.
96.

In material part, the First Lien Letter for the McDonald loan states as follows:
FIRST LIEN LETTER
Customer:

Gary McDonald

Property:

12299 South 4000 West
Riverton, UT 84065

Loan No.

3853166-1

Commitment No:
Lender:
Date:
Loan Amount:

sl65407
Centennial Bank, Inc.
May 24,2006
$1,704,375.00

To Whom It May Concern:
In connection with the property covered by the captioned Commitment For Title
Insurance, this letter advises you that we will completely disburse the mortgage
reference above upon recording of the trust deed.
This mortgage will be insured as a valid first lien upon the captioned property
subject to exceptions [none indicated], which are shown in our Commitment
* * *

Mountain View Title
By: [Jane Stevenson]
Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, fl 16.
97.

A true and accurate copy of the First Lien Letter for the McDonald loan is attached as

Exhibit 7. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, fl 17.
98.

In material part, the Closing Instructions for the McDonald loan state as follows:
CENTENNIAL BANK
CLOSING INSTRUCTIONS
Date:
Title Company
Order #:
Escrow Officer:
Borrower:

May 25,2006
Mountain View Title
si 65407
Jane Stevenson
Gary McDonald

You are instructed to record the trust deed once you can guarantee Centennial
Bank a first Hen position on the property. Other closing instructions are as
follows:
1.
Please execute First Lien Letter, or Closing Protection Letter for this loan,
prior to funding.
* #*

A true and accurate copy of the Closing Instructions is attached as Exhibit 8, (italics in original).
Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, fl 18.
99.

In addition to the First Lien Letter and the Closing Instructions, Driscoll prepared

Centennial Bank's Deed of Trust (Exhibit 5), a promissory note (hereinafter "the Promissory Note")
(Exhibit 6), a construction loan agreement (hereinafter the "Construction Loan Agreement") (Exliibit 9),
and other documents to be executed by Mr. McDonald at closing. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, \ 19.
100.

She did not prepare a deed conveying title to the Property to Mr. McDonald individually

because it was the responsibility of the title company to make sure the appropriate documents were

executed at closing so that title to the Property was properly vested and that the Deed of Trust was a first
Ken upon the Property. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, 120; Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, K 18.
101.

On April 21, 2006, copies of the documents were sent to Mr. McDonald so he could

review them prior to closing. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, 1f 21.
102.

Before she sent the Loan package for closing, she examined the Loan documentation and

determined that all pre-closing requirements had been satisfied. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, ^f 22.
103.

In late April or early May 2006, Driscoll called Mountain View Title & Escrow and told

an escrow officer that the Bank had a loan to close. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, ^ 15.
Delivery of the Loan Materials to the Title Company for Closing
104.

The Loan package was sent to the title company on or about May 25,2006. Affidavit of

Cheryl Driscoll, If 23.
105.

The escrow officer had previously received an order for a title commitment from

Republic Mortgage. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, fl 3.
106.

The Title Commitment showed Gary McDonald as the "Proposed Insured" for an ALTA

owner's policy. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, ^f 7.
107.

This means that Gary McDonald was to own the Property individually so that he could

encumber the Property with a deed of trust to secure a loan from Centennial Bank. Affidavit of Jane
Stevenson,fl8.
108.

The Title Commitment showed Centennial Bank as the "Proposed Insured" for an ALTA

loan policy. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, fl 9.
109.

This means that Centennial Bank was to have a first lien deed of trust upon the Property

owned by Gary McDonald, individually. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, ^f 10.

110.

Among other exceptions in Schedule B Section 2 of the Title Commitment, the

commitment showed two liens, one in favor of Millennia Investment Corporation and the other in favor
of Cottonwood Assets, both recorded in the office of the Salt Lalce County Recorder on March 24,2006
as Entry No. 9673409 and Entry No. 9673410, respectively. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, U11.
111.

It was the escrow officer's understanding that since this was an A&D loan, Gary

McDonald would be purchasing the Property and the Loan proceeds would be used to develop the
Property into a subdivision. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, fl 12.
112.

As part of this process, it was necessary for the loans to Millennia and Cottonwood to be

folly paid and the deeds of trusts securing those loans to be reconveyed so that Centennial Bank's deed
of trust would be a first position lien deed of trust. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, ^ 13.
113.

The Loan package, which had been prepared by the Bank, arrived shortly after the escrow

officer's conversation with Ms. Driscoll. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, ^f 16.
114.

Centennial Bank prepares its own loan documentation, including the deed of trust.

Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, ^ 17.
115.

However, the Bank did not supply a deed necessary to vest title to the Property in

McDonald. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, fl 18.
116.

The Bank did not supply a deed to vest the Property in McDonald because it was the. title

company's responsibility to malce sure appropriate documents are executed at closing so that title to the
Property was properly vested and that the Bank's deed of trust was a first lien upon the Property.
Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, fl 20.
117.

When the Loan Package came to the title company from the Bank, the Deed of Trust had

already been prepared by the Bank for Gary McDonald to execute in his individual capacity. Affidavit
of Jane Stevenson, ^f 19.

118.

The escrow officer understood that the Loan was to Gary McDonald in his individual

capacity, not to G&L Mae, Inc., McDonald's corporation. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, 120.
119.

After she received the Loan packagefromthe Bank, the escrow officer called McDonald

to get his authorization for her to call Millennia Investment Corporation and Cottonwood Assets to get
the payoffs on those two loans. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, ^ 14.
120.

She also arranged for McDonald to come in and close the Loan. Affidavit of Jane

Stevenson, Tf 21.
121.

In preparing to close the Loan, she read Centennial Bank's Closing Instructions dated

May 25,2006, Exhibit 8, which in pertinent part state:
* # #

You are instructed to record the trust deed once you can guarantee Centennial
Bank afirstlien position on the property. Other closing conditions are as follows:
1.
funding.

Please execute First Lien Letter, or issue Closing Protection Letter for this loan, prior to
* * *

Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, ^ 22.
122.

These instructions were consistent with her understanding that Centennial Bank was

intended to have afirstlien deed of trust on the Property to secure the Loan to Gary McDonald.
Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, $ 23.
123.

McDonald came in to the title company and the Loan was closed on May 26,2006.

Affidavit of Jane Stevenson,fl24.
124.

At that time, McDonald brought two other individuals to the closing with him. Affidavit

of Jane Stevenson, ^ 25.
125.

The escrow officer believes that one of the gentlemen was Defendant Ryan Andersen.

Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, % 26.

126.

During the closing, the three gentlemen spoke about how they were going to get started

on the construction.forthe subdivision. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, 1f 27.
127.

Among other documents signed at the closing, Defendant McDonald executed the

following:
•

The Promissory Note, executed by Gary McDonald, individually, Exhibit 6,

•

The Centennial Bank Deed of Trust, Exhibit 5, which among other provisions provided as

follows:
Further assurances. At any time, and from time to time, upon request from
Lender, Trustor will make, execute and deliver, or will cause to be made,
executed or delivered, to Lender or to Lender's designee... [any document
or documents] necessary or desirable in order to effectuate, complete perfect,
continue or preserve . . . (2) the liens and security interests created by this
Deed of Trust as first and prior liens on the Property;
•

A Settlement Statement executed by Gary McDonald individually, Exhibit 10, showing how

the Loan proceeds were to be disbursed;
9 A Service Disclosure Statement that included the language "Notice To First Lien Mortgage
Applicants" Exhibit 11, executed by Gary McDonald, individually;
• A Personal Statement of Income of Gary McDonald for the year ended 12/31/2005, Exhibit
12, executed by Gary McDonald;
• A Personal Balance Sheet of Gary McDonald dated December 31, 2005, Exhibit 13, executed
by Gary McDonald;
•

A Construction Loan Agreement, Exhibit 9, which included the following Representations

and Warranties:
Representations and Warranties
a)
Lien Priority. Unless otherwise previously disclosed to the Lender in
writing, Borrower has not entered into or granted any Security Agreements . . .

that would be prior or that may in any way be superior to Lender's Security
Interests and rights in and to such Collateral.
b)
Title to Property. Borrower has, or on the date of first disbursement of Loan
proceeds will have, good and marketable title to the Collateral, free and clear of all
defects, liens, and encumbrances
•

A Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement executed by Gary McDonald, individually,

Exhibit 14,
•

A Patridt Act Disclosure, Exhibit 16, executed by McDonald individually.

•

A Disbursement Request and Authorization, which indicates that the Loan was taken out

personally, and not by McDonald's business, Exhibit 15. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, f 28.
128.

The escrow officer obtained the payoffs from Millennia Investment Corporation and

Cottonwood Assets on or about June 1,2006, Exhibits 17 and 18. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, ^ 29.
129.

She executed the First Lien Letter, Exhibit 7, which was returned to Ms. Driscoll at the

Bank, with the other closing documents, on or about May 26,2006. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, If 30.
130.

In returning the First Lien Letter to Ms. Driscoll, it was the escrow officer's intent, and

she represented to the Bank, that the Bank's deed of trust was, and would be, afirstlien upon the
Property. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, ^[31.
131.

However, the escrow officer made a mistake in the closing in not having Gary McDonald

execute a deed as President of G&L Mac, Inc. to Gary McDonald, individually, as required by the terms
of the agreement between McDonald and the Bank, and in not recording such a deed in the official
records of the Salt Lake County Recorder. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, ^ 32,39.
132.

It was her mistake alone, and not the mistake of Mr. McDonald or the Bank. Affidavit of

Jane Stevenson, f 40.

133.

Neither the Bank nor Mr. McDonald were aware or had any knowledge of her mistake.

Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, ^ 41; Affidavit of Cheryl DriscoU, ^ 39.
Return of the Loan Materials To Centennial Bank for Funding
134.

The escrow officer returned the Loan package to Driscoll on or about May 26,2006.

Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, ^ 30.
135.

After the escrow officer sent the package back to Centennial Bank, the escrow officer

telephoned Cheryl Driscoll to make sure the proposed distributions from the closing balanced. Affidavit
of Jane Stevenson, Tf 33,
136.

In early June 2006, Driscoll received the Loan package back from the title company.

Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, If 24.
137.

Driscoll reviewed the Loan materials and determined that all of the pre-funding

requirements had been satisfied. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll,fl25.
13 8.

She deteimined that the First Lien Letter, Exhibit 7, had been signed by the title company

and returned to the Bank. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, *| 26.
139.

She determined that there were no exceptions indicated on the First Lien Letter.

Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, ^ 27.
140.

She checked and confirmed that Gary McDonald had executed the Promissory Note,

Exhibit 6, individually. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, If 28.
141.

She checked and confirmed that Gary McDonald had executed the Deed of Trust, Exhibit

5, individually. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, Tf 29.
142.

She checked and confirmed that Gary McDonald had executed the Boixower's Request

and Authorization For Disbursement, Exhibit 15. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, 1f 30.

143.

She checked and confirmed that Gary McDonald had executed the Truth In Lending

Disclosures, Exhibit 14. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, Tf 31144.

She checked and confirmed that Gary McDonald had executed the Construction Loan

Agreement, Exhibit 9, which in the "Representations and Warranties" section states:
Lien Priority. Unless otherwise previously disclosed to Lender in
writing, Borrower has not entered into or granted any Security
Agreement, or permitted the filing or attachment of any Security
Interests on or affecting any of the Collateral directly or indirectly
securing repayment of Borrower's Loan and Note, that would be
prior or that may in any way be superior to Lender's Security Interest
and right in and to such Collateral.
* * *

Title to ..Property. Borrower has, or on the date of first disbursement
of Loan proceeds will have, good and marketable title to the [Property]
free and clear of all defects, liens, and encumbrances . . . .
Affidavit of Cheryl Diiscoll,ffif32,33.
145.

Driscoll checked and confirmed that Gary McDonald had executed the Patriot Act

Disclosure, Exhibit 16, that identifies Gary McDonald as the "Borrower". Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll,
1f34.
146.

She examined the Title Commitment, Exhibit 1, and confirmed that the Bank was the

insured lender. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, f 35.
147.

She examined the Title Commitment and confirmed that the Deed of Trust would be

insured in first position. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, ^ 36.
148.

She examined the Title Commitment and confirmed that there were no unacceptable

exceptions to coverage of the policy. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, ^ 37.
149.

Because the lender's policy of title insurance is delivered to the Bank after funding,

Driscoll examined both the First Lien Letter and the Title Commitment to confirm that the Deed of Trust
was a first lien. Affidavit of Cheiyl Driscoll, Tf 38.

150.

She had no knowledge that the Bank's deed of trust would not be a valid first lien upon

the Property. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, ^ 39.
151.

If she had known, or had been told, that the Deed of Trust would not be a valid first lien

upon the Property, she would not have authorized the fiinding of the Loan. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll,
140.
152.

After she determined that all pre-funding requirements had been satisfied, she authorized

the fiinding of the Loan and the Loan proceeds were wired to the title company for disbursement.
Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, % 41.
153.

On June 2, 2006, the title company received a wire transfer from Centennial Bank's

Ogden, Utah office in the amount of $864,452.23, Exhibit 19. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson,fl34.
154.

Also on June 2,2006, the title company received another wire transfer from Centennial

Bank's Ogden, Utah office in the amount of $226,175.17, Exhibit 20. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, Tf 35.
155.

Consistent with the Closing Statement, the wire transfers were used to payoff Millennia

Investment Corporation and Cottonwood Assets. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, ^ 36.
156.

The escrow officer requested deeds of reconveyance for the Millennia Investment and

Cottonwood Assets deeds of trust, Exhibits 21 and 22, so that they could be recorded and Centennial
Bank's Deed of Trust would be a first lien deed of trust upon the Property. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson,
H37.
157.

She also caused Centennial Bank's Deed of Trust, Exhibit 5, to be recorded in the office

of the Salt Lake County Recorder. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, ^ 38.
158.

This occurred on June 2,2006. Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll, ] 42.

Discovery of the Mistake by the Escrow Officer
159.

Later, in December 2006, the escrow officer discovered her mistake in not having Gary

McDonald execute, and in not recording, a deed from G&L Mac, Inc. to Gary McDonald, individually.
Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, If 42.
160.

Upon discovering this mistake, she immediately contacted Mr. McDonald and a title

company in Salt Lake City and arranged to have him sign a Special Warranty Deed and to have the deed
recorded. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, *$ 43.
161.

In the interim, the Florence Deed of Trust and the Taylor Deed of Trust were recorded in

the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder. Exhibits 24 and 25, respectively.
Miscellany
162.

The Centennial Bank Trust Deed was properly entered in the Salt Lake County

Recorder's entry record, and was properly indexed in the grantors', grantees' mortgagors5 and
mortgagees' indices. Affidavit of Michael Hendry, fl 6.
163.

At any time after the recordation of the Centennial Bank Deed of Trust on June 2,2006, a

reasonable title examination would have discovered the" Deed of Trast. Affidavit of Michael Hendry, ^
7.
164.

If after June 2,2006, any person had contacted Centennial Bank and had inquired about

the Bank's Loan to Gary McDonald, the Bank would have informed that person of the Bank's interest in
the Property. Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm, ^f 40.
165.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 24 is a true and accurate copy of the Florence Deed of Trast.

Defendants Taylor and Shattuck's Answer, Cross-Claim, Counterclaim, and Third-Party Complaint.
166.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 25 is a true and accurate copy of the Taylor Deed of Trust.

Defendants Taylor and Shattuck's Answer, Cross-Claim, Counterclaim, and Third-Party Complaint.

167.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 26 is a true and accurate copy of the Taylor Promissory Note,

for which the Taylor Deed of Trust stands as security. Defendants Taylor and Shattuck's Answer,
Cross-Claim, Counterclaim, and Third-Party Complaint.
168.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 27 is a true and accurate copy of the warranty from Toucan

Properties to G&L Mac, Inc., dated March 22,2006. Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, ^ 44.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS5 DEED OF TRUST IS ENTITLED TO A PRIORITY OVER DEFENDANTS'
DEEDS OF TRUST PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE SUBROGATION.
Utah courts have long recognized the doctrine of Equitable Subrogation. Beginning in 1929, in
the case of Bingham v. Walker Bros. Bankers, 283 P. 1055 (Utah 1929),-and folly discussed in the
seminal case of Martin v. Hickenlooper, 59 P. 1139 (Utah 1936), Utah courts have recognized that
Equitable Subrogation is "a wholesome and highly meritorious doctrine and is now highly favored in
equity". Hickenlooper, 59 P. at 1140.
At its core, the doctrine provides that where, as in this case, there is an agreement, express or
implied, that the lender whose money pays off a lien will have the same status as the lien his money
releases, that the lender shall have the same status as the liens that were satisfied with the lender's '
proceeds. Hickenlooper, 59 P. at 1152. As recently as 2006, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized
Hickenlooper and this doctrine. Machock v. Fink, 137 P.3d 779,784 (2006) (".. .. under the equitable
doctrine of subrogation, the guarantor may step into the position of the creditor, foreclose the trust deed
and seek a deficiency from the debtor

"). In explaining the doctrine, the Court stated:

Suffice it to say that where there is a promise on the part of the
mortgagor . . . given to one who pays money to pay off a lien, that
such lender will be in equally as good position as regards security
as the lien holder whose lien his money was intended to discharge

and did discharge. He will be considered in equity as an assignee
of the lien and especially where assurances are given him that his
lien will be or is afirstlien.
Hickenlooper, 59 P. 2d at 1152.
A. Through His Agent Stevenson, McDonald Implicitly Represented To Plaintiff That The
Bank's Loan Would Be Secured By A First Lien Deed of Trust
In this case, McDonald, through his agent Peterson, implicitly represented to Centennial Bank
that its lien would be afirstlien upon the Property through the act of submitting an application for an
A&D loan. McDonald instructed his agent Stevenson to obtain a loan secured by afirstHen deed of
trust on the Property. Statement of Undisputed Facts, (cc S.O.F.")ffif16,22. Based on his years of
experience as a mortgage loan officer, Stevenson knew that most banks in the Ogden area would not
make an A&D loan unless the loan was secured by afirstlien. S.O.F., ^ 23. Also, based upon the five or
six loans that he had previously placed with the Bank, he knew specifically that it was Centennial
Bank's policy only to accept first liens on A&D loans. S.O.F., % 21. By submitting the loan application
to Smith with this knowledge and understanding, Stevenson, and hence McDonald, implicitly
represented to the Bank that its loan would be secured by afirstposition lien.
Further, at each stage in the loan processing by the Bank, the representation of afirstlien
continued. For example, when Stevenson submitted the Loan to Morris Smith, it was done with the
understanding that the Bank's lien would be a first lien. S.O.F., fl 29, 33, 35, 39, 40. When Smith
presented the Loan package to Suzanne Gnehm, it was presented with the understanding that the Loan
was going to be secured by afirstlien deed of trust S,O.F., ^ 44, 45, 51, 53 54, 55, 68,70. The same
is true when the Loan was presented to the Loan Committee. S.O.F.,ffif77, 78. Further still, and
consistent with Stevenson's understanding, (S.O.F.,ffif23,27) the Bank's policy was only to approve
A&D loans if such loans were secured by afirstlien. S.O.F., % 35.

Accordingly, by submitting an application for an A&D loan to the Bank, McDonald, through his
agent, implicitly represented to the Bank that its loan would be secured by a first lien.
B.
McDonald Expressly Represented and Warranted To The Bank That Its Deed of
Trust Would Be A First Lien Deed of Trust.
Not only did McDonald implicitly represent to the Bank that the Loan would be secured by a
first lien, he expressly represented and warranted that such would be the case. At closing, McDonald
executed the Construction Loan Agreement, Exhibit 9, which in pertinent part he represented and
warranted that he would not enter into any agreement that "would be prior or that in any way be
superior" to the Banlc's Deed of Trust. S.O.F., % 127. In so doing, McDonald agreed and promised that
no lien would be prior or superior to the lien of the Bank and hence, the Bank's lien was to be the first
lien upon the Property. McDonald also represented and warranted to the Bank that he would have good
and marketable title to the Property, "free and clear of all defects, liens, and encumbrances". S.O.F., %
127. By representing and warranting that the Property would be free and clear of all defects, liens, and
encumbrances, he agreed and promised that the Banlc's lien would not be subject to any other liens. In
other words, McDonald agreed and promised that the Banlc's lien would be a first lien.
Indeed, the facts of this case are even stronger than those of Hickenlooper because not only did
McDonald, as owner, "represent" to the Bank that the Loan would be secured by a first lien, he
"wan-anted" that such would be the case.
A warranty is an assurance by one party to an agreement of the
existence of a fact upon which the other party can rely. It is intended precisely
to relieve the promisee of any duty to ascertain facts for himself, and amounts to a
promise to indemnify the promisee for any loss if the fact warranted proves untrue.
Paccori, Inc. v. U.S., 399F.2d 162,166 (Ct. CI. 1968). Utah law recognizes the law of warranty.
WeJchman v. Wood, 353 P.2d 165,167 (Utah 1960) ("The substance of such a warranty is, in effect, a
promise to respond in damages proximately caused by the nonexistence of a represented fact or the

failure of a promised event to occur.") Hickenlooper holds that where "assurances" are given that a lien
will be a first lien, equitable subrogation is appropriate. Hickenlooper, 59 P. at 1152. Paccori, -Inc.
defines a warranty as an "assurance". Accordingly, McDonald expressly "assured" the Bank that its lien
would be a first lien deed of trust
C.
The Title Company Represented To Plaintiff That Its Deed of Trust Would Be A
First Lien Deed Of Trust Upon The Property.
In addition, the title company which closed the Loan also represented to the Bank that the Bank's
lien would be a first lien deed of trust. The title company signed and returned the First Lien Letter,
Exhibit 7, to the Bank. S.O.F., ^ 129. hi so doing, the escrow officer expressly represented to the Bank
that its lien was a first lien. S.O.F., K130. Further, in the Closing Instructions, Exhibit 8, the title
company was instructed to record the Deed of Trust only when it could guarantee the Bank's Deed of
Trust was afirst lien. S.O.F., ^f 98. By recording the Deed of Trust, the title company implicitly
represented to the Bank that the Deed of Trust was a first lien.
D.
The Proceeds Of The Bank's Loan Were In Fact Used To Satisfy The Millennia and
Cottonwood Loans.
It is undisputed that Centennial Bank's money in fact was used to satisfy the loans to Millenia
Investment Coiporation and Cottonwood Assets, which held first and second position liens, respectively.
S.O.F., Tf 155. $864,452.23 went in satisfaction of the Millennia Investment loan. S.O.F., K 153,
Exhibit 19. $226,175.16 went in satisfaction of the Cottonwood Assets loan. S.O.F.,^ 154, Exhibit 20.
E.

Conclusion.

As stated in Hickenlooper:
Suffice it to say that where there is a promise on the part of the mortgagor or his transferee,
given to one who pays money to pay off a lien, that such lender will be in equally as good
position as regards security as the lien holder whose litn his money was intended to discharge
and did discharge. He will be considered in equity as an assignee of the lien and specially where
assurances are given him that his lien will be or is a first lien.

Id at 1152. Accordingly, under the doctrine of Equitable Subrogation, Plaintiff is entitled to be
subrogated to the positions of Millennia Investment Corporation and Cottonwood Assets, Because
Millennia and Cottonwood's liens were prior to those of Defendants Florence and Taylor, Centennial
Bank's Deed of Trust enjoys a priority over those two liens pursuant to the doctrine.

POINT n
BASED UPON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF RECORD, PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A
DECREE REFORMING THE DECEMBER 22,2006 SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED SO THAT
IT IS EFFECTIVE AS OF JUNE 2,2006.
A.

The Doctrine of Reformation Is Weil-Established in Utah Law.

As in the case of Equitable Subrogation, it is well established Utah law that reformation of a
deed is appropriate where the terms of the deed are mistaken and do not show the true intent of the
parties' agreement. Generally, there are two grounds for reformation: mutual mistalce of the parties, or
ignorance or mistake by one party, coupled with fraud by the other party. Hottinger v, Jensen, 684 P.2d
1271,1273 (Utah 1984) ("Reformation of a deed is a proceeding in equity and is appropriate where the
terms of the written instrument are mistaken in that they do not show the true intent of the agreement
between the parties.")
Courts of equity allow reformation in the case of a mistake by a scrivener or a draftsman, as in
this case, where by reason of a mistake on the part of the scrivener, a written agreement does not
accurately reflect the intent of the parties. Reformation of Instruments § 19, 66 AmJur.2d 243, (2001).
Under-the doctrine of scrivener's error, the mistake of a scrivener may be reformed based upon parol
evidence. Id. Utah case law has long recognized this equitable concept. Neilson v. Rucker, 333P.2d
1067 (Utah 1959) (A mistake in the names of the payees in an escrow was obviously a "scrivener's
error").

B. The Undisputed Facts Of This Case Establish That Plaintiff is Entitled To A Decree of
Reformation In This Case.
In this case, both the Bank and McDonald agreed that the Loan was to be a personal loan secured
by the Property. However, at the closing, the escrow agent failed to have Gary McDonald execute a
deed from his corporation, G&L Mac, Inc., to himself, individually, and to have that deed recorded, in
accordance with the parties9 agreement. S.O.F.,ffif131,132. After she discovered her mistake, the
escrow officer obtained and recorded a Special Warranty Deed from G&L Mac, Inc. to McDonald on
December 22,2006. S.O.R,ffif159,160. Plaintiff is entitled to a reformation of the December 22,
2006 Special Warranty Deed so that it is effective June 2, 2006, the date of the Parties5 closing.
1.

McDonald Intended The Loan To Be A Personal Loan Secured By The Property.

The undisputed facts of record demonstrate that McDonald intended the Loan to be a personal loan
secured by the Property. S.O.F., ^ 16. The Loan was not intended to be, and was not made, to G&L
Mac, Inc., McDonald's corporation. McDonald's loan officer and agent, Eric Peterson, testified in his
affidavit that both he and McDonald understood that McDonald was applying for a loan in McDonald's
individual capacity. S.O.F., ^f 22. McDonald and his loan officer understood and agreed that the Loan
was to be secured by the Property, which was to be owned by McDonald, individually. S.O.F., ^ 22.
Both McDonald and Stevenson understood that the purpose for the Loan was, a) for McDonald to
borrow enough money to finish paying for the Property and to pay off existing liens and encumbrances
on the Property, b) the Loan was to be a personal loan, secured by a first lien deed of trust on the
Property that was to be owned by Mr.-McDonald, personally, and c) the Loan proceeds would be used to
acquire the Property, clear title to the Property of all liens and encumbrances, and pay for the
subdivision improvements to the Property. S.O.R, f 22. Accordingly, it is undisputed that McDonald
intended the Property to be held in his name, individually, and for it to be security for the Loan.

2.

Centennial Bank Intended The Loan To Be A Personal Loan Secured By The

Property. It is also undisputed that Centennial Bank intended to make a personal loan to McDonald.
S.O.F.,ffif29,33, 37. The Bank understood that the Loan was to be secured by the Property, which was
to be owned by McDonald, individually. S.O.F.,ffif33,38. The Bank did not bargain for and did not
understand that the Loan was to be secured by property owned by McDonald's corporation, G&L Mac,
Inc. At each step in the Loan approval process, the representation was made to the Bank that the
purpose for the Loan was, a) for Mr. McDonald to borcow enough money to finish paying for the
Property and to pay off existing liens and encumbrances on the Property, b) the Loan was to be a
personal loan, secured by a first lien deed of trust on the Property that was to be owned by Mr.
McDonald, personally, and c) the Loan proceeds would be used to acquire the Property, clear title to the
Property of all liens and encumbrances, and pay for the subdivision improvements to the Property.
S.O.R,ffif29,33,44,51,77.
Hence, both McDonald and the Bank understood that the Bank would not have made the Loan
unless the Loan was made personally to McDonald and was secured by a first lien on the Property,
which was to be held in McDonald's name, personally.
3.

The Mistake Was The Mistake Of The Escrow Officer Alone, And Not The Mistake

Of Either McDonald Or The Bank. It was only after the Loan package had been prepared by the
Bank, agreed to by McDonald, and was sent to the title company for closing, that the mistake occurred.
S.O.F., If 159. Dining the closing, the escrow officer failed to have Gary McDonald execute a deed from
G&L Mac, Inc. to Gary McDonald, individually. S.O.F.,ffif131,132. Obviously, since she did not
have McDonald execute a deed, there was no deed to be recorded. Hence, the mistake was not a mistake
of one of the parties, but rather was that of the escrow officer, with whom both parties had contracted to
close the Loan. S.O.F.,ffif132,150.

After the Loan documentation was approved by McDonald and the Bank, all that was required
was for the title company to close the transaction, which required McDonald to execute the Loan
documents, and for the title company to record the documents. It was during the closing process at the
title company that the escrow officer failed to have McDonald execute a deed from G&L Mac, Inc. to
McDonald, individually. S.O.F., If 131. Importantly, this mistake has been acknowledged by the escrow
officer who closed the Loan. S.O.F., ^f 132. The escrow officer testified in her affidavit that she made
this mistake by failing to obtain a deed from McDonald's corporation to McDonald, individually.
S.O.F., ^f 131. She endeavored to correct that mistake six months after the closing, in December 2006,
by obtaining and recording the Special Warranty Deed. S.O.F.,ffi[159,160. This matter is before the
Court because the Florence Deed of Trust and the Taylor Deed of Trust were recorded in the interim.
S.O.F.,f 161.
4

Conclusion. These are the classic circumstances of a scrivener's error. Based upon the

title company's error, reformation of the December 22,2006 Special Warranty Deed is appropriate.
C. Once The Special Warranty Deed Is Reformed, It "Relates Back" and Vests Title to
the Property in Gary McDonald, Individually, as the Parties Originally Intended and The
Centennial Bank Deed of Trust Shall Have A Priority Over Defendants' Deeds of Trusts.
Once refonned, the Special Warranty Deed relates back and vests title as if the deed had been
executed and recorded on June 2,2006. Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.2d 405,408 fn. 1 (Utah App.
1987)(ccThe general rale is that reformation of a deed relates back to, and takes effect from, the date of
conveyance and is binding on all except bona fide purchasers without notice and those standing in
similar relations. L.E. Myers Co. v. Harbor Insurance Co., 61 111. App.3d 496,24 111. Dec. 182,384
N.E.2d 1340 (1978) and cases cited therein.")-

Hence, should the Court grant this motion, Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust shall be folly enforceable
and valid as if the Special Wari'anty Deed had been executed and recorded on June 2,2006. Under these
circumstances, Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust shall have apriority over Defendants' Deeds of Trusts.
D.

Defendants Cannot Defeat Plaintiffs' Motion Because Defendants Are Not Bona Fide

Takers.
In Utah, it is clear that a bona fide purchaser can cut off the right of reformation. See Hottinger
v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984) ("The right of reformation of a deed can be cut off by
purchase of the property by a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the mistake"). A bona fide
purchaser is "one who takes without actual or constructive knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on
notice of the complainant's equity..," at the time of the transaction involved. Blodgett v. Marsh, 590
P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978). Further, the Utah Supreme Court, in defining notice, has stated that,
[ajctual or constructive notice defeats a subsequent purchaser's interest. A subsequent
purchaser must therefore, show that he had no actual notice, i.e., no personal knowledge, of a
prior conveyance or that the prior conveyance did not impart constructive notice, i.e., was not
recorded before his conveyance in the same land was recorded.
Utah Farm Prod Credit Ass'n v. Wasatch Bank 734 P.2d 904, 906 n. 2 (Utah 1986) (per curiam)
(emphasis added). See also Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American Sav. &LoanAss% 739 P.2d 1133,
1136 (Utah 1987) (If a subsequent purchaser has information or facts which would put a prudent person
upon inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge, an unrecorded conveyance is not void
as against that subsequent purchaser).
The recordation of the Centennial Bank Deed of Trust put a reasonable person on a duty to
inquire as to what interest Centennial Bank claimed in the Property. S.O.F., f 162,163. If they had
inquired, Centennial Bank would have informed both Defendants that Centennial Bank claimed a lien on
the Property to secure the Loan to Gary McDonald. S.O.F., ^ 164.

E. Defendant Taylor Cannot Defeat Reformation Because He Had Actual Knowledge of
Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust And Because Defendant Taylor Agreed To Subordinate His Lien to the
Lien of Centennial Bank.
Defendant Taylor cs Deed of Trust secures the payment of a promissory note dated September 5,
2006. Of particular interest is a provision in Taylor's note that reads as follows:
PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF ANY OF THE LOTS IN MCKENZIE PARK
ESTATES SUBDIVISION SHALL BE DISBURSED FIRST TO CENTENNIAL
BANK, THEN ANY AND ALL REMAINING FUNDS SHALL BE PAYABLE TO
BRADFORD E. TAYLOR.
McDonald executed this note as President of G&L Mac, Inc. on September 5,2006. S.O.F., ^f 164. In
addition, the terms of the Promissory Note were "read and approved by" Bradford E. Taylor. S.O.F., f
164.
The consequences of these facts are twofold. First, Defendant Taylor had actual knowledge of
Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust. At a minimum, Defendant Taylor was under a duty to inquire. See Diversified
Equities, above. Second, it is also clear that under the terms of Taylor's note, Taylor agreed that
Plaintiff would be paid first out of the sale of any of the lots in the McKenzie Park Estates Subdivision.
Accordingly, Defendant Tyler cannot defeat Plaintiffs5 claim of reformation.
POINT m
PLAINTIFFS' DEED OF TRUST ENJOYS A PRIORITY OVER DEFENDANTS'
DEEDS OF TRUST PURSUANT TO UTAH'S AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE AND RACE
NOTICE RECORDING STATUTES.
In this case, Gary McDonald executed the Deed of Trust in his individual capacity on June 2,
2006, at a time when record title to the Property was in the name of G&L Mac, Inc. S.O.F., ^ 131.
Subsequently, after discovering her error, the escrow officer obtained and had McDonald execute the
Special Warranty Deed, which was recorded on December 22,2006. S.O.F., f^ 159,160. Utah's
After-Acquired Title statute in effect at the time reads as follows:

(1) If any person conveys any real estate by conveyance purporting to convey the same in fee
simple absolute, and at the time of the conveyance the person does not have the legal estate in
the real estate, but afterwards acquires the same:
(a) the legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee, the
grantee's heirs, successors, or assigns; and
(b) the conveyance shall be as valid as if the legal estate had been in'the grantor at the
time of the conveyance.
(2)(a) Subsection (1) applies to a conveyance by:
(i) warranty deed;
(ii) special warranty deed; or
(iii) trust deed.
U.C.A. § 57-1-10 (2006).
Utah's After-Acquired Title statute, U.C.A. § 57-l-10(2)(a) (2006) above, applies to the deed of
trust and special warranty deed in this case. When McDonald executed the Centennial Bank Deed of
Trust at a time when he did not own title, he purported to convey title of the Property to the Trustee. Id.
When McDonald executed the Special Warranty Deed the statute became applicable. As a consequence,
the effect of the Deed of Trust and the December 22,2006 Special Warranty Deed is to vest title to the
Property in the Trustee "as i f McDonald had been vested with title to the Property on June 2,2006, the
time when he executed the Centennial Bank Deed of Trust. The result is that "the conveyance [to the
Plaintiff is] as valid as if the legal estate had been in [McDonald] at the time of [Plaintiffs' Deed of
Trust]" U.GA. § 57-M0(l)(b)(2006).
In this case, it is undisputed that Defendant Florence was on constructive notice of Plaintiffs'
Deed of Trust because it was recorded on June 2,2006, seventeen days before Defendant Florence's
Deed of Trust was recorded. S.O.F., ^f 161. Defendant Taylor was on both constructive and actual
notice of Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust. This is because Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust was recorded three months

before the Taylor Deed of Trust and because Defendant Taylor acknowledged Plaintiffs interest in the
Property in the Taylor Promissory Note. S.O.F.,ffif161,164.
The relief requested by Plaintiffs is consistent with the authorities which have addressed
circumstances where intervening interests come into play with the After-Acquired Title doctrine, which
is also referred to as estoppel by deed. Love v. Arnold Industries, 63 P.3d 721 (Utah 2002) ("The [AfterAcquired Title] statute has codified in part the equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed, sometimes
referred to as the doctrine of after-acquired title.55). As stated in American Law ofProperty, Little
Brown and Company, A. James Casner, Editor in Chief, § 15.22 p. 849 n.3 (1952):
[Tjhere is a clash between the equally beneficent doctrines of estoppel [by deed] and of
[constructive] notice. The only way to avoid it is by a judicial construction that the record of the
earlier deed, prior to the execution and delivery the later deed, is nevertheless record notice to the
second purchaser in spite of the fact that at date of the record of the deed was a nullity in whole
or in part for lack of title in the grantor.
As a consequence, when the Special Warranty Deed was recorded, title to the Property vested in
McDonald, individually, "as if5 the legal estate had been in McDonald at the time he executed the
Bank's Deed of Trust. Therefore, the Deed of Trust is a valid, enforceable lien upon the Property,
effective "as of" June 2, 2006.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court grant this motion.
DATED this c / #

day of April, 2009.
Resp9#f$Iy submitted,
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Counterclaim and Cross-Claim
Defendants.
COMES NOW Bradford E Taylor, by and through his attorneys Tycksen & Shattuck,
L.C., and respectfully presents this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Brad Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, as follows:
INTRODUCTION
This is an action to quiet title to several subdivision lots located in the city of Riverton, in
Salt Lake County. The properties at issue are Lots 3,4, 5, 8, 9,10,11,12,13, 14 and 16 of Plat
"A" McKenzie Park Estates Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof in the Salt Lake
County Recorder's office (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Property"). At issue in this
case are four deeds of trust and five mechanic's lien claims, all of which were recorded in the
Salt Lake County Recorder's office, and all of which claim to be the first and paramount lien
upon the Property. The instruments relevant to this action are as follows and were recorded in
the official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder as indicated below:
•

a Deed of Trust and Assignments of Rents, dated June 1,2006, executed by Gary
McDonald and Ryan Andersen, in favor of Defendant Bradford E. Taylor,
recorded on June 5,2006, as Entry No. 9742676, in Book 9303, at Pages 60136019 (the June 1, 2006 Taylor Deed of Trust);

•

a Construction Loan Deed of Trust, executed by Defendant Gary McDonald,
individually on June 2,2006, in favor of Plaintiff Centennial Bank, Inc., recorded
June 2,2006, as Entry No. 9742028, in Book 9303, at Page 2800 (Centennial
Bank's Deed of Trust);

•

a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents executed by Defendant Ryan
Andersen, individually, in favor of Defendant Casey Florence, recorded on June
15,2006, as Entry Number 9757188, in Book 9310, at Page 342 (the Florence
Deed of Trust);

•

a Deed of Trust with Assignments of Rents executed by G&L Mac, Inc., in favor
of Defendant Bradford E. Taylor, recorded on September 6,2006, as Entry No.

9836108, in Book 9347, at Page 429 (the September 5, 2006 Taylor Deed of
Trust); and
•

five claims of mechanic's liens in favor of Lyman W. Dutson, Bernard and Azora
Dutson, and Gray Excavation, Inc., all recorded in September 2007.

On June 1,2006, Brad Taylor received a Deed of Trust to the Property from both Gary
McDonald and Ryan Andersen, while such was actually held in the name of G&L Mac, Inc.
Subsequently, on September 5,2006, G&L Mac, Inc. executed a Deed of Trust in favor of Brad
Taylor.
Unbeknownst to Taylor, Gary McDonald and Ryan Andersen each in their individual
capacity attempted to encumber G&L Mac's property by personally entering into agreements
with third parties on June 2, 2006 and June 15, 2006, prior to G&L Mac, Inc., the real owner in
interest, encumbering the property in favor of Brad Taylor.
In reliance on the representations made by Ryan Andersen and the execution of the Deed
of TrustfromG&L Mac, Inc., Brad Taylor seeks partial summary judgment from this Court
decreeing: 1) that Brad Taylor's Deed of Trust is a valid, enforceable lien as against all parties;
and 2) that the December 22., 2006 Special Warranty Deed has no retroactive effect because of
Brad Taylor's reliance on the representations of Ryan Andersen and the Deed of Trust from
G&L Mac. Taylor's motion does not address the priority or validity of any of the mechanic's
lien claims, and reserves the right to address the same at some point in the future after the Court
has ruled on the motions for partial summary judgment now pending.
Plaintiff erroneously asserts a priority over the Florence and Taylor Deeds of Trust based
upon three theories: 1) the doctrine of Equitable Subrogation; 2) the doctrine of Reformation;
and 3) the doctrine of After-Acquired Title. Brad Taylor prays the Court deny Centennial's
motion for partial summary judgment, and grant his motion based on the fact that he entered into
an arms-length transaction as a bona-fide lender and lent money against the property on June 1,

2006, secured by a Deed of Trust of the same date. Subsequently Taylor obtained a deed of trast
from G&L Mac, Inc., but in the interim, Centennial and Florence loaned money to McDonald
and Andersen respectively (not to G&L Mac, Inc.). Now, Centennial Bank and Casey Florence
assert that they are entitled to priority over Mr. Taylor in the subject property.
Brad Taylor hereby incorporates in to this memorandum the objections (filed
conjunctively) to all or at least part of the following paragraphs in the Affidavit's submitted by
Centennial in support of its motion:
1. Aff
2. Aff.
3. Aff.
4. Aff
5. Aff.

of Cheryll Driscoll: fflf 13,14, .15,16, 18,20,21,23,32,33, and 40
of Eric C. Stevenson:fflf9,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,22,23,24,26,27, and 28
of Jane Stevenson: fflf 8,10,11,13,15,22, 26,27,28, 40, and 41
of Michael Hendry: ffl 6 and 7
of Morris Smith: ffl 7, 9,11,12,13,14, and 18

6. Aff. of Suzanne Gnehm: ffif 5, 8,9,11,12, 13,14,23,26,35, 36, and 40.
Accordingly, Brad Taylor disputes in their entirety the corresponding paragraphs in
Centennial's Statement of Facts paragraphs 9,12,13,14, 15,16,17,22, 23, 24, 27, 28,29, 35,
37, 38,39,40,44, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 64, 68, 77, 78,93, 94, 95, 96, 98,101,104,107,109,110,
112,103, 121,125,126,132,133, 151,162,163 and 164. Brad Taylor disputes in part the
corresponding paragraphs in Centennial's Statement of Facts paragraphs 17, 33, 49, 50,116,
127, 144, as set forth in his objections.
Brad Taylor has no objection to the other affidavit paragraphs so long as Gary McDonald
is properly served in this lawsuit and has notice of the same so that he is able to respond to the
repeated assertions made in the aforementioned affidavits that are attributed to him.
Although many statements in the affidavits submitted by the Plaintiff in support of its
motion are inappropriate, and have been objected to, the remaining statements regarding the
documents of record on the property remain before the court, and coupled with the affidavit of

Brad Taylor, support the Court's entry ofjudgment in favor of Mr. Taylor as compared to the
interests of Centennial Bank and Casey Florence.
Based upon the undisputed facts of record, Brad Taylor is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law that his Deeds of Trust enjoy a priority over the Centennial Bank and Casey Florence
encumbrances. Furthermore, there are factual determinations that are necessary for the Court to
make if it is to grant Centennial's motion. Therefore, the Court must deny summary judgment as
to Centennial at this time.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

In the Spring of 2006 Ryan Andersen approached Brad Taylor about borrowing money to

purchase property in Riverton, Utah. Brad Taylor ultimately agreed to loan money to Gary
McDonald and Ryan Andersen and G&L Mac, Inc. See Aff. of Brad Taylor Regarding Motions
for Partial Summary Judgment (hereafter "Taylor Aff.") ^[3, filed previously.
2.

At the time of the initial loan, Brad Taylor understood that the money he was loaning

would be used for the purchase of the property G&L Mac was going to develop into the
McKenzie Park Estates Subdivision. See Taylor Aff. f4.
3.

In May 2006 Brad Taylor negotiated the terms of his agreement with Ryan Andersen of

G&L Mac, Inc. All of Brad Taylor's negotiations were done directly with Ryan Andersen, and
only indirectly with Gary McDonald. See Taylor Aff. Tf5.
4.

Brad Taylor understood that if he made the loan, he would have afirstposition lien on

G&L Mac's property (covering lots 3,4, 5, 8,9,10,11,12,13,14 and 16 of Plat "A" McKenzie
Park Estates Subdivision - the subject of this lawsuit). See Taylor Aff. Tf6.
5.

Ryan Andersen informed Brad Taylor that his money would be used to acquire the

property, and that Andersen and McDonald would subsequently obtain financing from
Centennial Bank to fund the development of the property. See Taylor Aff. f7.

6.

Ryan Andersen assured Brad Taylor that his loan would be secured in first position on

the property. To make sure his loan was properly secured against the property, they agreed to
use First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc. ("First Southwestern Title") as a middleman to
release the funds Brad Taylor was loaning only after his position was secured against the
property. See Taylor Aff. f8.
7.

Ryan Andersen provided Brad Taylor with a note for the loan. See Taylor Aff. T[9.

8.

Gary McDonald and Ryan Andersen executed a Deed of Trust on June 1,2006 to secure

the $335,000 note. The Deed of Trust and Assignment of Rents was recorded with the Salt Lake
County Recorder on June 5, 2006. A true and correct copy of the trust deed note, dated June 1,
2006, is attached to the Taylor Aff. as Exhibit 1.
9.

Brad Taylor believes based on his many transactions with First Southwestern Title that

he instructed Dan Blanco of First Southwestern (Trustee) that the loan was not to be funded until
the Deed of Trust and Assignment of Rents was properly recorded with the County recorder.
See Taylor Aff. %l 1.; see also the amendment to Affidavit of Bradford Taylor regarding motions
for partial summary judgmentfflf3-5 (filed previously).
10.

UponfirstSouthwestern Title's release of Brad Taylor's $226,000, he believed that his

interests were secured as of June 1,2006 by the recording of the executed Deed of Trust and
Assignment of Rents. He did not think that First Southwestern Title Agency would release the
funds before recording the deed of trust. See Taylor Aff. f 12.
11.

Accordingly, on June 1,2006, Brad Taylor caused $226,000 to be wired to First

Southwestern Title for G&L Mac, Inc. The wire was completed on June 2,2006 by 12:14 p.m.
See Taylor Aff. ^[13.

12.

Pursuant to the agreement, G&L Mac, Inc. would add $175.17 to the $226,000, and have

First Southwestern Title wire the funds to Mountain View Title's account with Zions Bank. See
Taylor Aff.fW.
13.

Brad Taylor understood that First Southwestern Title wired the money ($226,175.17) to

Mountain View title on June 2, 2006 shortly after receiving his wire of $226,000. See Taylor
Aff. 1fl5.
14

On June 2,2006 at 1:02 p.m., Zions Bank received a wire in the amount of $226,175.17

(reference no. 20061530338200) that was deposited into the Zions Bank customer account to
which it was directed at 1:07 p.m. that same day See Aff. of Troy Kohler (herafter "Kohler
Aff.55) 1f3,filedpreviously.
15.

On June 2, 2006 at 2:45 p.m., Zions Bank received a wire in the amount of $864,452.23

(reference no. 20061530479700) that was deposited into the Zions Bank customer account to
which it was directed at 2:57 p.m. that same day. See Kohler Aff. ^[4.
16.

Gary McDonald, in his individual capacity, executed a Construction Loan Deed of Trust

in the amount of $1,704,375.00, in favor of Plaintiff Centennial Bank, Inc., which was then
recorded on June 2,2006, as Entry No. 9742028, in Book 9303, at Page 2800 (hereinafter
"Centennial Deed of Trust55). A copy of the Centennial Deed of Trust is attached to the Aff. of
Suzanne Gnehm as Exhibit 5.
17.

Until several months later, Brad Taylor was unaware that the Deed of Trust and

Assignment of Rents had not actually been recorded until June 5,2006 (see Exhibit 2). He is
uncertain as to why the Deed of Trust was not recorded on June 1st as per his agreement with
Gary McDonald, Ryan Andersen and G&L Mac, Inc., and his instructions to First Southwestern
Title Agency. He believed that it had been recorded on June 1,2006. See Taylor Aff. ^[16.

18.

At the time Brad Taylor reached the June 1,2006 agreement with McDonald and

Andersen, it was his understanding that before his loan was due -- that is during the 1-year period
leading up to the payoff date of June 1,2007 - as individual lots were sold, G&L Mac would
pay Centennial Bank a portion of the money it received on each lot as payment on the
development loan, and the remainder would come to Brad Taylor as pre-payment on the
purchase loan. See Taylor Aff. ^[17.
19.

Brad Taylor did not agree to subrogate his loan to the one Gary McDonald and Ryan

Andersen would subsequently obtain from Centennial Bank.
20.

Brad Taylor was not concerned about his agreement to allow periodic prepayments to be

made to him after Centennial Bank took some of the profits upon the sale of lots in the
subdivision, because he knew that it was agreed that his note was secured on the property and he
understood that he was in first position as of June 1, 2006. See Taylor Aff. f 18.
21.

It was Brad Taylor's understanding, based on Ryan Andersen's estimate, that each lot

would generate about $100,000 in profits that G&L would use to pay towards his note of
$335,000. See Taylor Aff. 1fl9.
22.

Ryan Andersen, while not personally owning the property at issue, individually executed

a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents in favor of Defendant Casey Florence, which was then
recorded on June 15,2006, as Entry Number 9757188, in Book 9310, at Page 342 (hereinafter
the "Florence Deed of Trust"). A copy of the Florence Deed of Trust is attached to the Aff. of
Jane Stevenson as Exhibit 24.
23.

Brad Taylor subsequently learned that the property was not in the name of either Gary

McDonald or Ryan Andersen, but in the name of G&L Mac, Inc. At about that same time, Ryan
Andersen approached Brad Taylor about loaning an additional $100,000 for the sewer bond on
the same project. See Taylor Aff. f20.

24.

Brad Taylor subsequently loaned an additional $100,000 to G&L Mac and Ryan

Andersen for the sewer bond, based on the understanding that he would get the bond back in full
from the City of Riverton when the project was completed. Ryan Andersen confirmed that
understanding. See Taylor Aff. f21; see also Exhibit 4 attached thereto.
25.

On September 5,2006 Gary McDonald of G&L Mac, Inc. (on behalf of G&L Mac) and

Ryan Andersen (individually) executed a note secured by deed of trust in the amount of
$435,000 that was intended to secure the note of June 1,2006 and the additional money Brad
Taylor lent for the sewer bond. A true and correct copy of the September 5,2006 Note Secured
by Deed of Trust is attached to the Taylor Aff. as Exhibit 5.
26.

On September 5,2006 G&L Mao, Inc., the owner of the property at issue at the time,

executed a Deed of Trust with Assignments of Rents in favor of Defendant Bradford E. Taylor,
which was recorded on September 6,2006, as Entry No. 9836108, in Book 9347, at Page 429 to
secure both loans on the property for a total repayment of $435,000 by June 1,2007. See Taylor
Aff. TJ23. The September 5,2006 Deed of Trust and Assignment of Rents is attached to the
Taylor Aff. as Exhibit 6.
27.

Ryan Andersen estimated that the project would be completed within six months of the

date Brad Taylor loaned the additional $100,000 (September 5, 2006), so Mr. Taylor believed
that he would receive his additional $100,000 plus interest, in addition to the initial $335,000
owing, by early 2007, or by June 1, 2007 at latest. See Taylor Aff. 1f24.
28.

Brad Taylor had no knowledge of or concern that his deed would not be in a first

position. During this entire process, Ryan Andersen represented to him, and it was his
understanding based on their conversations that any money borrowed from Centennial Bank
would be solely for the development of the property, and as such would be junior to Brad
Taylor's interest in the property. See Taylor Aff. If25.

29.

Brad Taylor filed his Notice of default on November 14, 2007, as Entry No. 10275328 in

the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. See Exhibit 1.
30.

Centennial Bank filed its Notice of default on February 11,2008 as Entry No. 10345110

10275328 in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office1. See Exhibit 2.
31.
32.

Casey Florence's Notice of Default was signed on March 11,2008. See Exhibit 3.
After Plaintiff filed its motion for partial summary judgment, Chad Shattuck (Taylor's

attorney) called Plaintiffs legal counsel, Mr. Sherman Young regarding service of process on
Gary McDonald. Mr. Shattuck spoke with Sherman about his concerns that Gary had not been
served in this lawsuit, and that Mr. Shattuck believed he needed to be served in the lawsuit for
the parties to be able to proceed with Plaintiffs summary judgment motion. See Aff. of Chad
Shattuck Regarding Service on Gary McDonald and Wire Transfer Documents (hereafter
"Shattuck Aff") Tf 5, filed previously.
33.

Mr. Shattuck and Mr. Young spoke on this subject on January 12,16 and 20,2009. Id.

34.

In conversations between Mr. Shattuck and Mr. Young, Mr. Young indicated that his

office had made some efforts to locate the correct Gary McDonald, but after successfully serving
what ultimately was the wrong person, had not been able to locate the correct person. Mr.
Young said he believed that his motion for summary judgment could be heard by the Court
without having Mr. McDonald served. Mr. Shattuck disagreed. See Shattuck Affidavit. 1f6.

1

Centennial later amended its notice of default. Both the initial and the amended notices are attached as Exhibit 2.

ARGUMENT
EQUITABLE SUBROGATION IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CENTENNIAL DEED OF TRUST,
BUT OPERATES TO SECURE BRAD TAYLOR'S LIEN IN FIRST POSITION.
The doctrine of Equitable Subrogation is applicable where a lender steps into the shoes of a
mortgagor and pays off a lien on the mortgaged property, thereby gaining the same status as the
lien that was satisfied with the lender's money. Martin v. Hickenlooper, 59 P. 1139,1152 (Utah
1936). No case law to supports Centennial's contention that the doctrine applies where one
borrows money against property that was never his in the first place, then a lender attempts to insert •
itself into the chain of title to the detriment of the first bona fide lender.
McDonald borrowed money from Taylor the day before he borrowed from Centennial
Barik. After McDonald borrowed money from Centennial against property he never owned, the
owner, G&L Mac, Inc., used the property as collateral on Taylor's loans of 06/1/06 and 9/5/06
representing to Taylor that his interest would be in first position as compared to any other interest.
Now, Centennial wants the Court to allow it insert itself ahead of Taylor to Mr. Taylor's detriment.
There is no legal support for such a maneuver, and equity will not permit such an unfair outcome.
Hickenlooper is distinguishable because Mrs. Zorn was able to insert her mortgage in the
place of the state, which held an interest superior to the interest of Mr. Martin because his interest
was explicitly subject to the state's mortgage. Id. at 1139. Mr. Taylor's loan was not subject to
any prior interest. Furthermore, in Hickenlooper, an owner made a representation to the lender
regarding priority, but here, McDonald, a non-owner made representations to Centennial Bank
regarding priority, that he had no ability to make.
A.

The Court cannot interfere to injure Brad Taylor, the first innocent lender.

Centennial wants the court to grant effect of a December 22,2006 conveyance from G&L
Mac, Inc. to Gary McDonald as if it had actually happened on or before June 2,2006. The flaw in

this theory is that it would injure an intervening innocent lien holder, Taylor, who had no notice of
any prior interest of any third party on June 1,2006 when he first lent money on the property.
Taylor even subsequently secured a Deed of Trust against the property from the owner, months
before Centennial attempted to do so. The law is clear that the equitable relief of subrogation "is
enforced solely for the accomplishment of substantial justice where one has an equity to invoke
which cannot injure an innocent person." Hickenlooper at 1141 (internal citation omitted and
emphasis added). On June 1,2006 there was nothing in the County Recorder's office to indicate
any interest held by Centennial.
Since Taylor has an interest in the property that precedes that of Centennial Bank, the bank
cannot rely on the equitable remedy of subrogation to do an injustice. Taylor did the same thing as
the bank, he paid hundreds of thousands of dollars so Gary McDonald and Ryan Andersen could
unencumber the property, and Mr. Taylor had actually wired the money for the purchase of the
property first. Subsequently, Taylor was first to obtain a secured interest with the real owner in
interest - G&L Mac, Inc. All of this was done before Centennial. Equity does not support
allowing Centennial to leap-frog the interest of Mr. Taylor, but demands that he, being the first
bonafidelender, be made whole first.
Interestingly, Centennial redacted two of its exhibits (Exhibits 19 and 20 of Jane
Stevenson's Aff.) to give the Court the impression that the money it wired was somehow wired
before the moneyfromTaylor. In fact, Mr. Taylor's wire went through first, and the facsimile
confirmations on each of the documents, as produced in discovery, show that such is the case. See
Shattuck Aff.ffif3-4, and exhibits 1 and 2 attached thereto. Zions Bank also confirmed that Mr.
Taylor's wire funded first. See Aff. of Troy Kohler,ffi[2-5,(filed previously).
B.

McDonald and Andersen executed their Deed of Trust in favor of Brad Taylor
on June 1,2006 to secure Brad Taylor's interest as of that date.

McDonald and Andersen both signed the Deed of Trust to encumber the subject property on
June 1, 2006. See Taylor Aff. ffiflO a n d Exhibit 2 attached thereto. It was Taylor's understanding
that the Deed of Trust would be recorded prior to the release of any funds (idffi[12-15)and that his
would be a first position lien (id Aff. |6). Taylor instructed First Southwestern Title Agency of
Utah to record the Deed of Trust before disbursement. Id_ f 11. On June 1, 2006 Ryan Andersen of
G&L Mac, Inc. expressly "assured" Brad Taylor that his lien would be a first lien deed of trust (id
Uf8-9) before McDonald entered into a deal with Centennial Bank the following day. Equity and
justice require this Court to not allow Centennial Bank to subrogate its loan and thereby injure Mr.
Taylor, who agreed to lend money on the property by executing a Deed of Trust to that end the day
before Centennial did so, and who also lent money against the property before Centennial did.
C.

Taylor instructed the Title Company to not release any funds until the Deed of
Trust and Assignment of Rents was recorded to secure his interest

The title company was instructed that Taylor's lien had to be secured by the recording of the
Deed of Trust and Assignment of Rents before the money could be wired. See Taylor Aff. ffifl 1,16.
If Taylor knew that the Deed of Trust had actually not been recorded on June 1st, he would not have
authorized the wire from his account to fund the loan. Idffif16.
D.

Taylor's Loan was used to satisfy the Millennia Investment loan.

It is undisputed that Brad Taylor's money in fact was used to satisfy the loans to Millennia
Investment Corporation and Cottonwood Assets. See Aff. of Jane Stevensen ffi[35-36. In fact, Mr.
Taylor's money was wired to Mountain View Title before Centennial's money was wired. The
$226,175.16 was received as partial satisfaction of the Millennia Investment loan ($957,565.11).
See Exhibits 17 and 18 to the Aff. of Jane Stevensen.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO REFORMATION
A.

Centennial cannot use the doctrine of Reformation to cure its own mistake, and
thereby injure an innocent lender with a senior interest.

"Reformation of a deed is a proceeding in equity and is appropriate where the terms of the
written instrument are mistaken in that they do not show the true intent of the agreement between
the parties." Hottinger v. Jensen. 684P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984).
Reformation "is not available to rewrite a contract to include terms never contemplated by
the parties." RHN Corp. v. Veibelk 96 P.3d 935, 945 (Utah, 2004); citing Cunningham v.
Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 552 (Utah 1984) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Mead, 2001
UT 58, H43,27P.3d 1115). In Cunningham, the Court said:
A court does not have carte blanche to reform any transaction to include terms
that it believes are fair. Its discretion is narrowly bounded. Reformation may
be appropriate where both parties were mistaken as to a term of the contract,
or where one party is mistaken and the other party is guilty of inequitable
conduct.
Cunningham, at 552 (emphasis added). Centennial intended to loan money to McDonald
personally; that is exactly what happened. Reformation cannot serve to fix documents that were
executed as intended. Centennial makes no claim forfraudcaused by G&L Mac, Inc., failing to
execute a deed to convey the property to McDonald. Centennial claims that its failure to obtain a
deed of trust from the owner of the property was the result of a "scrivener's error." But this is not
so. Centennial Bank prepares its own loan documents, including deeds of trust (See Aff. of Jane
Stevenson ^fl7), but it "did not prepare a deed conveying title to the property to Mr. McDonald
individually...." (Aff. of Cheryl Driscoll 1J20). hi fact, Centennial contends in its memorandum
that: "after the Loan documentation was approved by McDonald and the Bank, all that was required
was for the title company to close the transaction, which required McDonald to execute the Loan
documents, and for the title company to record the documents." Centennial's Memo., P. 35. That
is what happened; now they do not like the result. Pursuant to RHN Corp., there can be no
reformation.

"It is important to note that an attempt to reform a deed is a proceeding in equity. A court
of equity will generally not assist one in extricating himself from circumstances which he has
created." Battistone v. American Land & Dev. Co., 607 P.2d 837, 839 (Utah 1980). No third party
prepared or even intended to prepare documents on behalf of Centennial. The title company just
had McDonald execute, in his individual capacity, the documents Centennial itself provided for
him to sign. See Stevenson Aff. Ufl8,19, 20,21, 28 and 32. Centennial prepared the package of
documents, failed to prepare one to obtain the propertyfromthe true owner, and is now faulting
the escrow officer for following Centennial's instructions to have McDonald execute the
documents Centennial provided. If Centennial prepares all of its own documents as it asserts, and
if all the title company had to do was close the transaction by executing the documents Centennial
had provided, where else was the "missing" deed supposed to come from? There was no mistake
by a draftsman, but Centennial failed to prepare and cause the necessary documents to be executed
to obtain title to the property at issuefromthe actual owner. Pursuant to Battistone, the Court
should not do inequity with the equitable doctrine of reformation by relieving Centennial of the
consequences of its own error.
Centennial cites Neilson v. Rucker, 333P.2d 1067 (Utah 1959), to show that Utah
recognizes the equitable concept of reformation. In Nielson, there was a mistake in the names of
the payees in a real property transaction, which the court found was a "scrivener's error," or the
fault of the draftsman writing the wrong names. However in this case there was no mistake by the
drafter. Centennial failed to prepare a document to gain title to the property (See Aff. of Cheryl
Driscollffi[19-20and Aff. of Jane Stevensonffi[28and 32). That is not a "scrivener's error." No
third party erred in drafting documents; in fact, Jane Stevenson actually used the documents
Centennial itself prepared. Now the bank is 'throwing her under the bus,' for doing so.

Unfortunately for Centennial, there is no case law to support the notion of reforming a deed
of trust to injure a prior interest holder. If the Court refoims Centennial's documents, it would
ignore the intentions of the parties executing them and also injure a third party, Mr. Taylor, who
lent money against the property before Centennial.
There was no scrivener's error in Centennial5 s transaction. Centennial just failed to prepare
documentation to obtain an interest in the propertyfromthe true owner. Both McDonald and the
bank knew that he was borrowing the money individually. During the closing process, Centennial
(not the title company nor McDonald) made the error, the consequence of which was that
Centennial's interest was not secured against the property of G&L Mac, Inc. Based upon the
Centennial's own error, reformation of the 12/22/06 Special Warranty Deed is not warranted
because it would injure Taylor, a bona fide lender infirstposition, and it would create the effect of
documents that admittedly were never prepared by Centennial or executed by McDonald (who has
not yet been joined in this lawsuit by lawful service of summons).
B.

No reformation without service on McDonald.

Gary McDonald has not yet been served with a summons and complaint in this lawsuit.
Centennial is aware that McDonald has not been joined by service of summons. See Aff. of Chad
Shattuck 1H[5-6. Only after proper service can the Court verify his intentions.
Utah law is clear that a grantor must be a party to an action where reformation is requested
by the grantee. In Battistone, ifra., the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Moreover, plaintiff is not entitled to reformation of the deedfromHales to Royal
Gardens because Hales is not a party to this lawsuit. In order to grant reformation,
all the parties to the deed who are affected immediately or consequentially by the
mistake should be made parties, as they are entitled to be heard upon any matter that
might affect their rights under the decree.
Battistone. at 838-839 (Utah 1980). Since Mr. McDonald has not been served in this lawsuit, and
therefore is not a party to it, Centennial cannot obtain reformation.

C.

Even if Centennial's Special Warranty Deed is reformed, it "relates back55 To
the day after Brad Taylor obtained an interest in the property.

Although reformation is not appropriate in this case, if the Court reforms the Special
Warranty Deed, it would relate back to June 2,2006. Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.2d 405, 408 &.
1 (Utah App. 1987). However, Brad Taylor obtained his interest on June 1,2006, therefore his
interest would still be superior to that of the Bank pursuant to the doctrine of equitable subrogation.
Taylor's Deed shall also have a priority over the interests of Mr. Florence.
D.

Brad Taylor can defeat Plaintiffs5 Motion because he is a bonafidetaker.

In Utah, "the right of reformation of a deed can be cut off by purchase of the property by a
bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the mistake." Hottinger v. Jensen 684 P.2d 1271,
1273 (Utah 1984). Since Mr. Taylor did not have actual or constructive knowledge on June 1, 2006
when he initially lent money against the property, his interest as a bona fide lender is superior to
that of Centennial's. The recording of the Centennial Bank Deed of Trust on June 2,2006 could
not possibly have put Brad Taylor on notice regarding money he had already lent on the same
property the day before.
The language in the promissory note of June 1,2006, and also found in the promissory note
of September 5, 2006, both payable to Brad Taylor, did not give Mr. Taylor any notice of a prior
interest held by Centennial. It was Mr. Taylor's understanding that he held afirstposition interest,
and merely agreed to allow Centennial to receive some moneyfromthe sale of lots before he did
until the time for full repayment arrived. See Taylor Aff. 1ffl 17-18.
Brad Taylor did not agree to subrogate his interest in the property at issue to the loan that
Centennial would make the next day. See Taylor Aff. fl7. Centennial claims in its brief that the
promissory note Taylor received shows that he agreed to subordinate his interest to that of
Centennial Bank, but Taylor testified that he never agreed to. Only Brad Taylor and Ryan

Andersen would know the intent of the language in the promissory note. This is a factual dispute
9

that the Court will have to determine, which is inappropriate on summary judgment.
THE DOCTRINE OF AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE IS INAPLICABLE TO
CENTENNIAL'S SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED.
One day after executing a Deed of Trust to Taylor (6/1/06), McDonald executed the Deed of
Trust in his individual capacity to Centennial Bank (June 2,2006). At both times, the Property was
actually held in the name of G&L Mac, Inc. Subsequently, on September 5, 2006, Taylor obtained
a Deed of TrustfromG&L Mac, Inc. Four and a half months later, G&L Mac, Inc. executed the
Special Warranty Deed to McDonald, which was recorded on December 22,2006. Utah's AfterAcquired Title statute in effect at the time reads as follows:
(1) If any person conveys any real estate by conveyance purporting to convey the
same in fee simple absolute, and at the time of the conveyance the person does not
have the legal estate in the real estate, but afterwards acquires the same:
(a)
(b)

the legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee,
the grantee's heirs, successors, or assigns; and
the conveyance shall be as valid as if the legal estate had been in the grantor
at the time of the conveyance.

(2)(a) Subsection (1) applies to a conveyance by:
(i) warranty deed; (ii) special warranty deed; or (iii) trust deed.
U.C.A. § 57-1-10 (2006). When a deed of trust is properly executed, title to the property is
conveyedfromthe trustor to the trustee. Interstate Laud Corporation v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101,
1006 (Utah App. 1990). Thus, Taylor's Deed of Trust of September 5,2006, conveyed title in the
property at issue to First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah in favor of Taylor as Beneficiary.
Utah's After-Acquired Title statute does not apply to the facts of this case. Although U.C.A.
§ 57-1-10(2)(a) (2006) applies to special warranty deeds, the statute was not intended to serve as a
mechanism for defrauding bona-fide takers and lenders. In fact, the contingency is clear in the very
2

Mr. Taylor does not ask the Court to reform anything, thus this factual dispute regarding Centennial's allegation of
subordination would not impact the Court's ability to apply the doctrine of subrogation in favor of Mr. Taylor.

language of the statute, where is states that if a person purports to convey real property to which he
does not have title, "but afterwards acquires the same," then, and only then does the legal title to
the property pass to the grantee as if the grantor had title at the time of the conveyance.
Importantly, McDonald could not get title to the property in December 2006, because G&L Mac
had already conveyed it to Mr. Taylor as of September 6,2006 (at the latest). Thus, McDonald did
not afterwards "acquire the same." Centennial now wants the Court to step in under the guise of
the after-acquired title doctrine, and undo a conveyance made by the actual owner almost four
months earlier. Such a function would be illogical and would destabilize all properly executed and
recorded conveyances.
Utah is a Race-Notice state. Utah's Race Notice Recording Act reads in part:
Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner prescribed by
this title . . . shall,fromthe time of its recording with the appropriate county
recorder, impart notice to all persons of their contents.
UCA §57-3-102. Brad Taylor's Deed of Trust and Assignment of Rents was recorded on
September 6,2006. As of September 6,2006 all persons have been on notice that the property at
issues was encumbered/conveyed by its true owner G&L Mac to Taylor.
Taylor's Deed of Trust enjoys a priority over the subsequently recorded Special Warranty
Deed from G&L Mac to McDonald pursuant to Utah's Race Notice Recording statute. Case law is
clear that the Trustee's interest in the Property is prior and superior to the Special Warranty Deed
because it was recorded first. Utah Farm Production Credit Assn v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904,
906 (Utah 1987). In order to prevail on a theory of after acquired title, Centennial must show that it
had no actual or constructive notice of the September 6,2006 recording for at least 107 days.
Plaintiffhas failed to even allege that there was no knowledge, in fact, it was the discovery that the
property was not in the name of Mr. McDonald that led to the subsequent execution of the Special

Warranty Deed. Plaintiff had notice of Taylor's interest, thus the theory of After-Acquired Title
remains inapplicable.
Centennial cites Love v. Arnold Industries, 63 P.3d 721 (Utah 2002) as support for the
contention that when the Special Warranty Deed was recorded, title vested in McDonald,
individually, "as i f the legal estate had been in McDonald at the time he executed the Bank's Deed
of Trust of June 2nd. Love is inapplicable; it stands for the premise that the after-acquired title
doctrine, or estoppel by deed applies not only to conveyances, but also to easements.
BRAD TAYLOR WAS FIRST TO NOTICE DEFAULT ON HIS LOAN,
THEREFORE HE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO CONDUCT HIS SALE
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THIS LAWSUIT.
Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-23 confers upon the trustee of a trust deed the power to sell
trust property if the trustor breaches a secured obligation. This power of sale must be exercised in
accordance with § 57-1-24. See Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d
217,219 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The power of sale conferred upon the trustee who is qualified under Subsection 57-121(l)(a)(i) or (iv) may not be exercised until:
(1) the trustee first files for record, in the office of the recorder of each county
where the trust property or some part or parcel of the trust property is situated, a
notice of default...
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24 (emphasis added). Taylorfiledhis Notice of Default on
November 14,2007, (Entry No. 10275328), long before Centennial Bankfiledits Notice on
February 11,2008 (Entry No. 10345110). Florence's Notice of Default was signed on
March 11, 2008. See Exhibits 1-3 respectively. Taylor's power of sale vested first.
Therefore, Taylor should be allowed to foreclose first on the property at the conclusion of
this lawsuit.

CONCLUSION
Pursuant to Hickenlooper, Equitable Subrogation cannot be applied in favor of Centennial
Bank because "This equitable principle is enforced solely for the accomplishment of substantial
justice where one has an equity to envoke which cannot injure an innocent person."
Hickenlooper, at 1141 (emphasis added).
As stated in Hickenlooper:
Suffice it to say that where there is a promise on the part of the mortgagor
or his transferee, given to one who pays money to pay off a lien, that such
lender will be in equally as good position as regards security as the lien holder
whose lien his money was intended to discharge and did discharge. He will be
considered in equity as an assignee of the lien and specially where assurances
are given him that his lien will be or is afirstlien.
Id. at 1152. Brad Taylor loaned money the day be fore Centennial did. It was represented to, and
Mr. Taylor was assured that his lien would be a first lien as a result of paying off the existing debt.
And, the proceeds of Mr. Taylor's loan were used to satisfy the Millennia Investment loan before
any portion of Centennial's money. Thus all of the requirements ofHickenlooper are satisfied as to
the money Taylor lent on the property.
Accordingly, under the doctrine of Equitable Subrogation, Brad Taylor is entitled to be
subrogated to the position of Millennia Investment Corporation. Because Millennia's lien was
prior to those of Centennial and Florence, Taylor's Deed of Trust enjoys a priority over those two
liens.
For the reasons stated herein, Brad Taylor respectfully requests the Court grant Brad
Taylor's motion for partial summary judgment and deny Centennial's motion for partial summary
judgment.
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DATED this 7

day of May 2009.
Respectfully submitted,
Sean ]\£awhiaifey
Chad C Shattuck
Attorneys for Brad Taylor, and
Pro se as Trustee
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and correct copy of the foregoing BRAD TAYLOR'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF BRAD TAYLOR'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to:
Sherman C. Young
Ivie & Young
226 West 2230 North
P.O. Box 657
Provo, UT 84603
Stanford Graham
2120 N.Valley View Dr.
Layton, UT 84040
John Walsh
2319 Foothill Dr. #270
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Ryan Andersen
561 W. Wild Willow Drive
Kamas, UT 84036
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NOTICE OF DEFAULT
Chad C Shatfuclc, a member of the Utah State Bar, as Successor Trustee under a
Trust Deed, dated September 5,2006, executed by G&L Mac INC., as Trustors), to First
Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc., as Trustee, in which Brad Taylor is named as
Beneficiary, which Trust Deed was recorded September 06,2006, as Entry No. 9836108,
in the Records of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and which
covers the following-described real property situated in Riverton City, State of Utah, to
wit:
See Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof*
hereby declares that a breach of an obligation for which the trust properly was conveyed
as security has occurred in that the principal and interest have not been paid, and said
obligation has matured. Trustor has failed and neglected to pay $545,000.00^ which
Trustor is required to pay pursuant to the provisions of said Trust Deed, The Successor
Trustee hereby declares that he elects to sell or cause to he sold all of such property to
satisfy the obligations secured thereby.
DATED this /fday of November 2007
ChadCSfiattud
STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAICE )
On the/y day of November 2007, persomft%a£pmred before me cEaEh
Shattuclt the signer of the foregoing mstmm$nt?7$w^^ly^cloiowledgoi to me fhatV
executed the same as Successor Trustee
•

•

^

Notary Public
i ^ & s

"^Notery Public ",n-t ^

l

/^SSk RAGHAELST0CK1KE J

' i l l fl^ffi JSI
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barton, Utah SM08S
My Commission Expires
~ April hpw
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EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT "A "

AM.l

.27-29-300-041-0000

BEGINNING SOUTH S9°57'17" EAST 283.00 FEET ALONG THE EAST-WEST CENTER OF SECTION LINE FROM THE
WEST QUARTER COMER OF SECTION 29, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, RANGE 1 WEST, SALT LAKE BASE AND
MERIDIAN; immS
CONTINUINfi SOUTH B9°57'17" EASTJ2M.D9 FEET ALONG THE EAST-VJE5T CENTER OF
SECTION UNETDTHE WESTRIGHT-OF-WAY OF BANGERTER HIGHWAY; THENCE ALONG SAID WEST RIGHTOF-WAY OF BANGERTER-HIGHWAY SOUTH OtW&S&WEST 669.25 FEET; THENCE NORTH B9°S6S1" WEST
494.47 FEETTO THESECTIOH LINE; THENCE ALONG SAID SECT1QH LINE NORTH D0°09'32" WEST*364.20
FEET} THENCE NORTH B9a57V EAST 190-00 FEET; THENCE NORTH 0DDD9'32" WEST 152.50 FEET; THENCE
SOUTH 89 D S7'i7" EAST 93.D0 FEET; THENCE NORTH OQO09!32'' WEST 152.50 FEETTO THE POINT OF
BEGINNING.

^^PFX^GTHEREmOMTHEFOLLOWrN^ESCRfflEPPMCELOF^

_ „ . ., „ . ™ r cprraoW LINE AND SOUTH 8 9 ° E 7 1 7 " EAST

STFEVFROMIHEWST^
HE-POINT OF BEGINNING.

ROPERTY*

o
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EXfflBIT 3

•WHEN RECORDED
PLEASE RETURN TO;
Casey Florence
9258 South 2490 West
West Jordan, UT 84088

Notice of Default and Election to Sell
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN hy Stanford A. Graham, Successor Trustee, that default has
occurred under a promissory note secured by a Deed of Trust executed by Ryan Anderson, as Trustor, and
Casey Florence, as beneficiary, which Deed of Trust was recorded on June 19,2006, as Entry No:
9757188, of the official records in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah,
describing Ihe real property .("Trust Property") therein as:
See Exhibit "A" for Legal Description.
A breach of the obligations for which the Trust Property was conveyed as .security has occurred in
that among other things, the payments, called for under the terms of the Promissory Note and Deed of
Trust have not been made and are now past due, plus accrued interest, late charges, costs, and attorney
fees By reason of such default, Casey Florence, through his tmstse, does hereby declare all sums secured
thereby immediately due and payable, and does elect to sell, or cause to be sold the Trust Property to
satisfy the obligations secured by the Deed of Trust.
This is written in an attempt to c o l l e t a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that
purpose Unless you notify us within thirty days after receipt of this notice that you dispute the validity of
this debt or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by us. If you notify us in writing
within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, we will obtain verification of
the debt and mail a copy to you.
DATED this / / - d a y of March, 2008.

STANFORD A. GRAHAM, Trustee
4548 South Atherton Drive, Suite 205
Salt Lake City, UT 84123'.
Office Hours: 8am - 5pm, M-F
(801)747-5854

STATE OP UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss.

.)

4}1
in*
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this jf]_ day of March, 2008, by Stanford
A. Graham..

SHERRY ALEGRE
uoiMPwm • srare OFVTAH
2B8B WEST 5975 SOUTH
ROY,UTB40B7.

C0MM. EXP, 08-22-2011
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SHERMAN C. YOUNG (3891)
JVIE& YOUNG
226 West 2230 North
P.O. Box 657Provo,UT 84603
Telephone: (§01) 375-3000
Facsimile: (801) 375-3067
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Centennial Bank, Inc. and Richard W. Jones, Trustee
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CENTENNIAL BANK, INC., and
RICHARD W. JONES, Trustee,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

GARY D. MCDONALD, LYNNEA J.
MCDONALD, G&L MAC, INC.; CASEY
FLORENCE, BRADFORD E. TAYLOR as
beneficiaries; CHAD C. SHATTUCK and
STANFORD A. GRAHAM, as Trustees;
GRAYEXCAVATION, INC.;
Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS'
COMBINED MEMORANDUM
IN REPLY AND SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT BRADFORD E. TAYLOR'S
CROSS-MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BRADFORD E. TAYLOR,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
RYAN ANDERSEN, and JOHN DOES 110,

Consolidated Civil Nos.:
080903426 and 080903653
Judge: Honorable Robert Faust
COBYTOjCLENT

Third Party Defendants.
GRAY EXCAVATION, INC., a Utah
corporation, JARED R. GRAY and HEIDI

fflHriitmiMf

H. GRAY, BERNARD W. DUTSON,
AZORA DUTSON, LYMAN DUTSON,
MICHAEL WEIS, LUCIA WEIS, LANE
MYERS, LANE MYERS
CONSTRUCTION, L.C., and JOHN DOES,
1-25,
J

Plaintiffs,
vs.

CENTENNIAL BANK, INC., GARY
MCDONALD, G&L MAC, INC., RYAN
ANDERSEN, CASEY FLORENCE,
BRADFORD E. TAYLOR, MOUNTAIN
VIEW TITLE AND ESCROW, and JOHN
DOES 1-100, as well as another person or
entity claiming any right, title or interest in
the real property which is the subject of this
action,
Defendants.

CENTENNIAL BANK, INC.,
Counterclaimant and Cross-Claimant,
vs.

GRAY EXCAVATION, INC., a Utah
corporation, JARED R. GRAY and HEIDI
H. GRAY, BERNARD W. DUTSON,
AZORA DUTSON, LYMAN DUTSON,
MICHAEL WEIS, LUCIA WEIS, LANE
MYERS, LANE MYERS
CONSTRUCTION, L.C., GARY
MCDONALD, G&L MAC, INC., RYAN
ANDERSEN, CASEY FLORENCE,
BRADFORD E. TAYLOR, MOUNTAIN
VD3W TITLE AND ESCROW, and JOHN
DOES 1-10, as well as another person or
entity claiming any right, title or interest in
the real property which is the subject of this

action.
Counterclaim and Cross-Claim
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
In these cross-motions for partial summary judgment, the Court must decide the relative
priority of two deeds of trust recorded against real property located in Riverton, Utah (hereinafter the
"Property"). Plaintiff hasfileda motion for partial summary judgment on the theories of equitable
subrogation, reformation, constructive notice, and after-acquired title. Defendant Bradford E. Taylor
has filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment asserting that he is entitled to a priority over
Plaintiffs' deed of trust1 Pursuant to a stipulation, the parties have agreed tofilefour memoranda,
rather than the six memoranda that Rule 7, U.R.C.P. would require. Accordingly, Plaintiffs hereby
submit their combined memorandum in reply and support of their motion for partial summary
judgment and in opposition to Defendant Taylor's motion for partial summary judgment.
As demonstrated herein, the undisputed facts of record establish that Plaintiffs are entitled to
partial summary judgment as a matter of law on the issue of the relative priorities of Plaintiffs5 and
Defendant Taylor's deeds of trust.

1

Defendant Taylor is the beneficiary under two deeds of trust. The first was recorded on June 5,2006, three days after
Plaintiffs' deed of trust. This deed of trust suffersfromtwo defects. First, it was recorded three days after the Banlc's deed
of trust was recorded. Second, this deed of trust suffersfromthe nearly identical defect that the Banlc's deed of trust suffers
from: it was executed by Gary McDonald and Ryan Andersen at a time when record title to the Property was in
McDonald's corporation, G&L Mac, Inc. Defendant's second trust deed was recorded on September 6,2006, three months
after Plaintiffs' deed of trust. In this action, Defendant Taylor is seeking to enforce only the September 6,2006 deed of
trust, which is claimed to secure debt in the amount of $435,000.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES.
A.

AH Of Plaintiffs' Facts Are Deemed Admitted Under Rule 7(c)(3)(A) Of The Utah

Rules Of Civil Procedure.

In this case, Defendant Bradford E. Taylor (hereinafter "Defendant",

"Defendant Taylor", or "Taylor") has failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact that would
preclude summaiy judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Centennial Bank and Richard W. Jones (hereinafter
"Plaintiffs" or the "Bank"). This is so because Taylor has failed to comply with Rules 7(c)(3)(A) and
(B), U.R.C.P. With emphasis, these rules provide as follows:
7(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists. Each
fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials,
such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact setforth in the moving party's
memorandum is deemed admittedfor the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted
by the responding party.
7(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a verbatim
restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may contain a separate
statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is
controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute,
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any
additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and
numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery
materials.
In this circumstance, Defendant Taylor has failed to comply with the three requisites of Rule
7(c)(3)(B). First, Taylor has not restated verbatim each of the Bank's facts that Taylor asserts is
controverted. Second, Taylor has not provided an explanation of the grounds for any dispute. Third,
Taylor has not supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials, the

Bnrra A
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evidentiary basis of a genuine issue of fact. As a consequence, all of Plaintiffs' 168 statements of fact
are deemed admitted under Rule 7(c)(3)(A).
B.

Taylor's Evidentiary Objections Are Not Meritorious. On February 13,2009,

Defendant filed evidentiary objections to the affidavits of Cheryl Driscoll, Suzanne Gnehm, Michael
Hendry, Morris Smith, and Eric C. Stevenson. On April 16,2009, Plaintiffs filed their Response To
Defendant Taylor's Evidentiary Objections. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate their response to
Defendant's objections by this reference. As demonstrated therein, none of Taylor's evidentiary
objections to Plaintiffs' affidavits are meritorious. All of Plaintiffs' facts are admissible under Utah's
Rules of Evidence. Taylor's evidentiary objections should therefore be overruled.
C.

Plaintiffs Have Filed A Motion To Serve Defendant Gary McDonald By

Publication. In the very near future, Plaintiffs shallfilea motion for service on Defendant Gary
McDonald by publication. This motion shall be supported by affidavits and memorandum. The
affidavits and memorandum shall demonstrate that Plaintiffs are entitled to an order serving Defendant
Gary McDonald by publication. As such, Taylor's arguments that Taylor is not a party to this action
shall be moot at the conclusion of the publication and answer period, at which time Plaintiffs intend to
take McDonald's default.
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT TAYLOR'S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED
MATERIAL FACTS.
Plaintiffs do not dispute Paragraphs 1-18,20-34 of Defendant's Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts.

2

Theoretically, Defendant could also raise an issue of fact in his Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in support of his
cross-motion for partial summary judgment. However, a review of Defendant's statement reveals that no such issue is
raised as to Plaintiffs' facts.

Plaintiffs hereby move to strike Paragraph 19 of DSOF because Defendant does not cite any
affidavit or other admissible evidence to support Paragraph 19, which reads as follows:
19.
Brad Taylor did not agree to subrogate his loan to the one Gary McDonald and Ryan
Andersen would subsequently obtain from Centennial Bank.
Paragraph 19 is not supported by affidavits or admissible evidence as required by Rule 56(e) U.R.C.P.
The Court should therefore strike Paragraph 19.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BASED UPON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS, PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO
SUMMARY JUDGMENT UPON THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE SUBROGATION.
A.

Defendant Has Offered No Persuasive Reason Why Martin v. Hickenlooper Does

Not Apply To The Bank's Deed Of Trust.

Defendant makes several unpersuasive arguments why

this Court should not equitably subrogate Plaintiffs to the positions of Millennia Investments and
Cottonwood Assets.
Initially, Defendant argues that because his funds were the first to arrive at the title company,
his deed of trust is entitled to priority over that of Plaintiffs. Defendant's Memorandum, Pages 1,2.
Defendant fails to provide this Court with any authority to support such a claim. This is because there
is no support in the law or equity that the priority of liens should be based upon the time at which
funds are received by a title company. Interests in real property are governed by Utah's Race-Notice
Statute, U.C.A.§ 57-3-102.
Next, Defendant inaccurately states that his lien was not subject to any other lien as was Mrs.
Zorn's lien in Martin v. Hickenlooper, 59 P. 1139 (Utah 1936). Defendant's Memorandum, page 1.
This is, of course, not true. The Millennia Investments and Cottonwood Assets liens were both a
matter of record and prior to Defendant's lien at the time he loaned his money to McDonald.
Pacre. (\ n f 1 6

Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts (hereinafter "PSOF"), ^f 36. Moreover, if Defendant's assertions were
true, there would be no lien to which Defendant could be subrogated.
Defendant next argues, 1) that McDonald and Andersen assured him that his lien would be a
first lien and, 2) that McDonald executed Taylor's deed of trust before McDonald executed the Bank's
deed trust. While assurances are an element of equitable subrogation under Martin v. Hickenlooper,
the date of execution of Defendant's deed of trust is not material.
Finally, Defendant incorrectly argues that his funds were used to satisfy the obligations owed
Millennia Investments and Cottonwood Assets. This is, of course, not correct. It is undisputed that
Defendant loaned McDonald $226,000. DSOF, If 11. The total obligations owed Millennia
Investments and Cottonwood Assets were $1,068,732.23. Exhibits 16 and 17 to Affidavit of Jane
Stevenson. Hence, even if all of Defendant's loan proceeds had been used, they would have only
partially satisfied the obligations owed Millennia Investments and Cottonwood Assets. It is also
undisputed that Defendant's funds were commingled with the Bank's in the title company's escrow
account. DSOF,ffif14,15. Defendant has not provided any evidence that would allow this Court to
trace any of the funds in this case.
Based upon the undisputed facts of this case, Plaintiffs are entitled to be equitably subrogated
to the positions of Millennia Investments and Cottonwood Assets. To the degree Defendant is also
entitled to be equitably subrogated, his interest is still subordinate and inferior to the Bank's for the
reasons stated below.
B.

Even If Defendant Is Entitled To Equitable Subrogation, Plaintiffs Are Entitled To

A Priority Over Defendant Because Defendant Was Under A Duty To Inquire As To The Bank's
Interest In The Property.

It would appear that both the Bank and Taylor are innocent victims of

the misrepresentations of Defendant McDonald. This is the case because McDonald represented to
Taylor that he would have a first lien deed of trust on the Property. DSOF, 1f 6. McDonald also
represented to the Bank that it would have a first lien deed of trust upon the Property. PSOF,fflf29,
33,35,39,40,44, 45, 51, 53, 54, 55,68,70, 77 and 78.- A significant difference between the positions
of Taylor and the Bank however, is the undisputed fact that Taylor knew McDonald was going to
obtain a loan from the Bank. DSOF,ffif5,18 and 20. Under the doctrine of inquiry notice, once
Taylor had knowledge of the Bank's interest in the property, he was under a duty to inquire and is
bound by all facts that such an inquiry would reveal.
Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry
is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led. When a person has sufficient
information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant of it.
Salt Lake, G. & W. By. Co. v. Allied Materials Co., 291 P.2d 883, 885 (1955).
In contrast to Defendant's position, the Bank had no notice or knowledge that McDonald was
borrowing money from Taylor and claimed an interest in the Property. E.g., PSOF, ^f 150.
C.

Defendant Is Not Entitled To A Priority Over The Bank's Deed Of Trust Because

Taylor's And The Bank's Funds Were Commingled In The Title Company's Trust Account.
Taylor asserts a priority over the Bank because he was the first to wire his money to the title
company's escrow account. Within the context of equitable subrogation however, it makes no
difference whose funds arrived first at the title company. This is the case for two reasons. First, cash
is fungible and it all went into the same account. PSOF,fflf153,154; DSOF,ffif14,15. Once the
Bank's and Taylor's funds were received into the title company's trust account, they were commingled
and lost any separate identity. Defendant has not provided any evidence through which this Court
could trace the funds. E.g., Smith v. Mosier, 201 P.3d 1001 (Utah 2009)("Tracing is used, for example,

when moneyfroma particular transaction that a court is reviewing has been commingled in a bank
account with other funds."). Defendant has presented no legal authority or reason why under the
doctrine of equitable subrogation he is entitled to a priority over the Bank simply because his funds
were the first to arrive at the escrow company.
D.

Maxims Of Equity Demonstrate That The Bank Is Entitled To A Priority In

Equitable Subrogation. Moreover, equitable subrogation is, obviously, an equitable doctrine. As
such, certain Maxims of Equity apply. These maxims demonstrate that even if like the Bank, Taylor is
also entitled to be equitably subrogated, in subrogation Centennial Bank still enjoys apriority over
Taylor.
1.

Equity Follows The Law. The first maxim applicable to this case is that, "Equity

Follows Hie Law". Centennial is entitled to a priority over Taylor because Centennial's deed of trust
was recorded on June 2,2006, three days before Taylor's June 5,2006, deed of trust was recorded and
three months before Taylor's $435,000 September 6,2006 deed of trust was recorded. Under U.C A. §
57-3-102, Utah's Race-Notice Recording Statute, Centennial's deed of trust has apriority over
Taylor's deed of trust as a matter of law, and equity follows the law.
In a closely analogous situation, the Utah Court of Appeals held that equitable subrogation was
not available to a mortgagee because the Utah Mechanic's Lien Statute, U.C.A. § 38-1-1 et seq. was
constructive notice. The Court of Appeals stated:
We conclude the constructive notice provided by Utah's mechanics' lien statutes defeats a claim
for equitable subrogation. The mechanics1 lien statutes are an expression of legislative intent
that should stay the hand of equity in this situation. If we held otherwise, we would violate the
equitable maxim that equity follows the law. Thus, because Richards commenced visible work
on the property at least seven days prior to the Ameristar refinancing, Security Pacific had
constructive knowledge of the mechanics1 lien via our mechanics' lien statutes.

Richards v. Security Pacific Nat Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 611-612 (Utah App. 1993). A similar analysis
applies under Utah's Race-Notice Recording Act U.C.A. § 57-3-102. Defendant was on constructive
notice of Plaintiffs' deed of trust pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-3-102 because it was recorded three months
before Defendant's $435,000 deed of trust was recorded. Because equity follows the law, even if
Defendant is entitled to equitable subrogation, Plaintiffs' deed of trust enjoys a priority because it was
recorded first
2.

When One Of Two Innocent Parties Must Suffer A Loss, The Burden Must Fall

On He Who Could Have Avoided The Loss. Secondly, where one of two parties, both guiltless of
intentional wrong, must suffer a loss, the one whose conduct, act, or omission created the
circumstances from which the loss resulted must stand the consequences. Hanson v. Beehive Security
Company, 380 P.2d 157 (Utah 1963) (Grantors who executed blank deed could not repudiate deed
after third party mortgagee relied upon it.). In this case, it is undisputed that Taylor made a loan to
McDonald which was not properly secured at a time when Taylor knew the Bank was to have an
interest in the Property. DSOF,fflf5,18. Stated otherwise, Taylor had the ability to protect himself
but did not. He could have completely avoid his loss through due diligence and proper real estate
closing procedures. Instead, he "believed" that his title company would not disburse until lie was in
first position and "did not think [his] title company would release [his] fluids before recording [his]
deed of trust" DSOF,ffi[ 9,10.
In contrast, Centennial did not disburse funds until it had completed its detailed real estate
closing procedures and had established that its deed of trust was insured as a first lien. PSOF,ffij146,
147,148,149 and 152. Hence, Taylor could have protected himself but chose not to. He created the
circumstances that resulted in his loss and must suffer the consequences.

3.

Equity Aids Those Who Have Been Vigilant, Not Those Who Sleep On Their

Rights. Thirdly, a closely related maxim holds that "Equity Aids Those Who Have Been Vigilant, Not
Those Who Sleep On Their Rights". As noted above, Taylor was not vigilant. He lent money to
McDonald and did not ensure that his lien was properly secured. DSOF,fflf8-15. Not only did
Defendant not protect his rights when he lent McDonald the initial $226,000, even more recklessly, he
advanced an additional $100,000 at a time when he, 1) knew that Centennial Bank was involved with
the Property, 2) knew that his June 5,2006 deed of trust was defective, DSOF, f 23, and 3) when he
was on constructive notice of Plaintiff s deed of trust which was a matter of record at the Salt Lake
County Recorder's office. DSOF, If 16; PSOF, ^ 157. Subsequent to becoming aware of these facts, to
secure the initial $226,000 and the additional $100,000, on September 6,2006, Taylor recorded a deed
of trust in the amount of $435,000. DSOF, 1 26. This is the deed of trust which Defendant now seeks
to have this Court equitably subrogate to a position prior and superior to the lien of Centennial Bank.
Taylor was not vigilant and is not entitled to equitable relief.
POINT II
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A DECREE OF REFORMATION FROM THIS COURT
BASED UPON THE SCRIVENER'S ERROR OF THE TITLE COMPANY.
A. The Failure Of The Title Company To Obtain A Deed From G&L Mac, Inc. To Gary
McDonald Until December 22,2006, Was A Scrivener's Error For Which Relief Should Be
Granted, It is undisputed that a court may grant relief for a scrivener's error. Reformation of
Instruments, § 19, 66 Am. Jur. 2d 243 (2001). Defendant argues however, that the failure of the title
company to prepare a deed is not a scrivener's error and that the mistake was the Bank's instead.
Defendant's Memorandum, p. 3-5. Defendant bases this argument on the undisputed fact that the Bank
prepares its own loan documents. PSOF, Tf 113. However, Defendant has not disputed that, while

preparing its own loan documents, the Bank relies upon the title company to prepare title documents to
ensure that the Bank's loan is secured. PSOF, \ 116. This is because it was the title company's
responsibility to make sure that appropriate documents are executed at closing so that title to the
Property was properly vested and that the Bank's trust deed was a first lien upon the Property. Id.
Moreover, the doctrine is not as limited as Defendant argues. For example,
While the right to have reformation is ordinarily limited to written agreements, the right of
reformation is not restricted in its application to any class or kind of conventional instruments,
with regard with to the form or the subject matter of the contract between the parties. Indeed
the power extends to all written contracts and agreements, and it may be said that no valid
written contract is beyond the reach of a court of equity for the purpose of reforming it
Reformation of Instruments, § 28, 66 Am. Jur. 2d 252 (2001). In this case, Plaintiff seeks to have the
Court reform the December 22,2006 Special Warranty Deed from G&L Mac. Inc. to Gary McDonald
so that it is effective the date of the parties' contract, June 2,2006. Such a request is clearly within the
equitable powers of the Court.
In general, where a written instrument does not express the true agreement and intention of the
parties thereto, it may be reformed as to any material defect, whether the defect is in regard to a
common-law or statutory requisite. Reformation may be had for a variance between a contract
and the instrument which expresses it, or a variance between a contract and an instrument
given in performance of the contract.
Id. at§ 48, p. 265, (italics added). Here, it is undisputed that the Bank entered into a contract for a loan
with Defendant McDonald and that the parties intended the loan to be secured by the Property, which
was to be held in McDonald in his individual capacity. PSOF,ffif22,29, 33,44,77. Through an error,
the scrivener failed to have the Special Warranty Deed executed until December 22,2006. Plaintiffs
are clearly entitled to a decree reforming the Special Warranty Deed so that it is consistent with the
parties' agreement.
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B.

As Reformed, Plaintiffs' Deed Of Trust Will Relate Back To June 2,2006, And

Plaintiffs' Trust Deed Will Be Prior And Superior To Defendant's Deed Of Trust
Defendant incorrectly argues that even if Plaintiffs' deed of trust is reformed, Defendant's deed of trust
will have apriority over Plaintiffs' lien. Defendant's Memorandum, p. 7. Defendant erroneously
asserts that his interest in the Property arose on June 1,2006, when he authorized his title company to
wire $226,000 to Mountain View Title and Esrow's trust account. See also, Defendant's
Memorandum, p. 2. As addressed earlier in this memorandum, interests in real estate are controlled by
Utah's Race-Notice Statute, U.C.A. § 57-3-102. Defendant obtains no interest in real property simply
because he authorized a transfer of funds into the escrow account.
C.

Defendant Is Not A Bona Fide Taker For Value, And Hence, Cannot Defeat

Plaintiffs' Reformation Claim. Defendant also incorrectly asserts that he is a bonafidetaker because
he transferred funds to the escrow account on June 1,2006, a day before Plaintiffs' deed of trust was
recorded on June 2, 2006. This argument also fails because Defendant obtains no interest in real
property simply because he authorized a transfer of funds into the escrow account. Interests in real
estate are governed by Utah's Race-Notice statute, U.C.A. § 57-3-102. Additionally, Defendant was
on inquiry notice before he advanced money to McDonald, because it is undisputed that McDonald and
Andersen told Defendant that the Bank would be financing the development of the Property. DSOF,
11f5,18,20.
POINT III
PLAINTIFFS' DEED OF TRUST ENJOYS A PRIORITY OVER DEFENDANT'S
DEED OF TRUST PURSUANT TO UTAH'S AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE STATUTE.
Defendant asserts that the After-Acquired Title doctrine does not apply because under Utah
law, a deed of trust is a conveyance, and that when G&L Mac, Inc. executed the September 2006 deed

of trust to Taylor, it conveyed fee simple title to the Property to Taylor. Taylor argues that as a
consequence of the execution of the September 2006 deed of trust, there was nothing left for G&L
Mac, Inc. to convey to McDonald in the December 2006 Special Warranty Deed and hence, Utah's
After-Acquired Title statute does not apply. Defendant's Memorandum, p. 8-9.
While on its face Defendant's argument may appear to be interesting, upon deeper analysis, it
is clear that Defendant's theory is well wide of the mark. This is so because while it is true that
Interstate Land Corporation v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101,1106 (Utah App. 1990) states that a deed of
trust is a "conveyance", Interstate Land Corporation does not say it is a conveyance of fee simple, as
would be the case with a warranty deed under U.C.A. § 57-1-12 ("A warranty deed when executed as
required by law shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee ..."). It is clear that
a conveyance under Utah's trust deed statute is less than a conveyance by warranty deed and does not
divest the trustor of all of her/his interest in a property. If this were not the case, all second position
deeds of trust in the state of Utah would be void due to the lack'of a grantor. See, Salt Lake County v.
Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 89 P.3d 155 (Utah 2004) ("wild deed55); see also, Sharp v. Riekhof, 747
P.2d 1044 (Utah, 1987)(deed void for want of a grantee).
Further, second position deeds of trust are ubiquitous throughout the real estatefinanceindustry
and good and marketable title is regularly conveyed after foreclosure of such deeds of trust. As such,
Defendant's position simply caimot be a correct statement of the law. After a conveyance to a trustee
of a deed of trust, some interest must remain in the trustor to allow the trustor to encumber the property
with a second, or even third position deed of trust. To hold otherwise would wreak havoc with
billions, if not trillions, of dollars of financing secured by second lien deeds of trust.
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Moreover, it is clear that under Utah law, the degree of ownership required for the attachment
of a deed of trust to real property is only one that is "sufficient to give the trustee enough interest in the
property to sell it in the event of nonpayment." Capital Assets Finance Services v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d
1090 (Utah App. 1998). Under Capital Assets, the interest necessary for a deed of trust to attach real
property is less than fee simple.
Hence, even though U.C.A. § 57-1-19(3) defines a deed of trust as a deed "conveying" real
property to a trustee, it does not say that the conveyance is a conveyance of title fee simple such that
the trustor retains no interest whatsoever after he encumbers his or her property. As a consequence,
after G&L Mac, Inc. encumbered the Property in favor of Defendant on September 6, 2006, G&L Mac,
Inc. retained enough interest in the Property to transfer it to Gary McDonald in December 2006. When
this occurred, Utah's After-Acquired Title statute vested title in McDonald "as i f he had been vested
on June 2,2006, thereby perfecting Plaintiffs5 deed of trust as a first lien upon the Property. Arnold
Industries, Inc. v. Love, 63 P.3d 721,726 (Utah 2002) ("Thus, a conveyance made by a grantor not
holding fee title to property is binding when the grantor later obtains fee title").
POINT IV
PLAINTIFFS' INTERESTS IN THE PROPERTY IS PRIOR AND SUPERIOR TO
DEFENDANT'S BASED UPON UTAH'S RACE-NOTICE RECORDING ACT.
As noted repeatedly above, Plaintiffs' deed of trust was recorded three months prior to
Defendant's deed of trust. It is long established Utah law that:
between two purchasers of real property, the first to validly record a conveyance and take
the property without notice of a prior interest in the property takes the property over a
purchaser who subsequently records a deed.

Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781 (Utah 2002). It is undisputed that Defendant took his interest with notice
and recorded his deed of trust after Plaintiffs recorded their deed of trust. Accordingly, Plaintiffs take
their interest over that of Defendant
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff respectfiiUy requests the Court enter partial summary
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant Bradford E. Taylor.
DATED this Z 7 day of May, 2009.
Respectfully submitted,

HERMAN C. YOUNG
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Centennial Bank, Inc. and
Richard W. Jones, Trustee
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Counterclaim and Cross-Claim
Defendants.
COMES NOW Bradford E Taylor, by and through his attorneys Tycksen & Shattuck, L.C.,
and respectfully presents this Reply Memorandum in Support of Brad Taylor's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, as follows:
SUMMARY
Utah's Race-Notice statute (U.C.A. 57-3-102) favors Mr. Taylor over Centennial Bank
since he was first to record a deed from the true owner months before Centennial Bank did so.
Likewise Equity favors Mr. Taylor over Centennial Bank, and cannot allow the bank to jump ahead
of Mr. Taylor. Equity favors Mr. Taylor because he was first to loan his money against the
property and first to secure his loan by obtaining a deed from the true owner in interest. Equity
follows the law, which gives Mr. Taylor priority since he recorded his deed of trust from G&L
Mac, Inc., the real owner in interest on September 6,2006; more than three months before
Centennial Bank attempted to obtain an interest from the owner on December 22, 2006. Mr. Taylor
did all he could to secure his interest, and successfully corrected his title errors as of September 6,
2006. Now Centennial Bank wants this Court to reward it for slumbering for nearly seven (7)
months, then attempting after the fact to obtain a secured interest in the property months after the
actual owner issued a deed of trust to Mr. Taylor.
REGARDING STATEMENT OF TJNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Plaintiff has admitted all of the undisputed facts submitted by Mr. Taylor in his

memorandum in support, except for ^[19 because the citation was inadvertently left off. Paragraph
17 of the affidavit of Bradford Taylor in Support Regarding Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment. Contains the very language reflected in undisputed fact #19. It is uncertain why the
intended citation ("Id") was left off. Mr. Taylor respectfully requests that the court overlook the
3

omission and recognize that the fact has been properly supported by his affidavit, which is of
record.
ARGUMENT
EQUITY FAVORS MR. TAYLOR
Plaintiff is seeking equitable relief from Utah's Race-Notice Statute (UCA §57-3-102) on
one hand, but argues on the other hand that the statute is a valid basis for the Court to ignore Mr.
Taylor's equitable argument. Plaintiff is inconsistent at best. Because Mr. Taylor was the first""
party to loan money on the property that is the subject of this litigation, equity should not deprive
him of his recorded position that is several months ahead of Centennial Bank. Centennial cannot
rely on equitable relief to get around the fact that Mr. Taylor recorded his deed of trust with the
County Recorder months before Centennial attempted to obtain a deed from the true owner of the
property because Centennial's title problem is its own fault. Battistone v. American Land & Dev.
Co., 607 P.2d 837, 839 (Utah 1980).
Centennial claims that Mr. Taylor's money was not used to pay off the Millennia
Investments an Cottonwood Assets loans based on the fact that the loans totaled more than Mr.
Taylor loaned. It is still nonetheless true that Mr. Taylor's money was first to be paid towards these
debts, before Centennial's money. Mr. Taylor has not asserted that his loan by itself satisfied the
two loans, neither did Centennial Bank's money. Certainly if the payoff funds were commingled
after they were wired as Centennial asserts, then the bank cannot claim that it's money was used to
pay the existing debts and that Mr. Taylor's money was not.
A.

Mr. Taylor had no duty to inquire regarding Centennial Bank's anticipated
future loan.

Mr. Taylor had no reason to believe that his deed would not be recorded in due course when
he executed it. He was certainly aware that Ryan Andersen and or Gary McDonald would at some
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time in the future borrow money for the development of the property, but understood that no loan
had been made yet, so there was no reason to inquire in that regard. Mr. McDonald was apparently
misleading both parties, and Mr. Taylor, being the first to be duped should not have to get in line
behind Centennial just because Centemiial claims that Mr. Taylor should have inquired. By the
same token, Centennial should have inquired to discover Mr. Taylor's loan since Centennial's loan
alone would not have satisfied the existing loans on the property, and Centennial knew that its loan
alone would not satisfy them. Certainly there must be some other lender contributing to the payoff.
B.

Brad Taylor's money was loaned first

Centennial makes a big issue of commingling after Mr. Taylor's-funds were wired to the
escrow account. The co-mingling is irrelevant. Since Mr. Taylor loaned the money first, and he
was also first to record a deedfromthe property owner, equity supports him being in line before
Centennial Bank, which was second to loan the money, and second to record a deed from the true
owner. It is irrelevant whether Mr. Taylor's funds were at some later time co-mingled with
Centennial's money to pay off the pre-existing debts.
C.

Equity follows the law, which is in Mr. Taylor's favor.

Mr. Taylor's deed from G&L Mac, Inc., the true owner, recorded September 6,2006,
became a matter of record for the world to see more than three months before Centennial obtained
any conveyance document from G&L Mac, Inc. It would be inequitable for Centennial to be
allowed by this Court to jump ahead of Mr. Taylor, especially because it was Mr. Taylor who was
first to secure his interest in the property by obtaining a deed from the true owner.
Centennial cites to case law regarding notice imparted by mechanic's work on property as
evidenced by a mechanic's lien (Richards v. Security Pacific. 849 P.2d 606 (Utah Ct. App 1993))
and tries to wrest that application of the law by inappropriately applying it to U.C.A. §57-3-102
regarding Constructive notice. First, constructive notice is a factual dispute that cannot be resolved
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on summary judgment Notably, the issue of constructive notice must be determined by the court in
order for the bank to leapfrog over Mr. Taylor because, as more fully explained in the
memorandum in support, Centennial Bank is seeking to have equity trump the race-notice statute to
Mr. Taylor's detriment. Conversely Mr. Taylor is not seeking equitable relief from the statute, and
on summary judgment the Court can rule in his favor. Secondly, Centennial's reliance on
mechanic's liens law has no application because Centennial itself loaned its money after Mr. Taylor
did. Furthermore, Centennial Bank never secured a deed from the true owner until several months
after Mr. Taylor did. Now Centennial is trying to leapfrog over Mr. Taylor despite the
consequence of its own admitted error.

CENTENNIAL BANK COULD HAVE AVOIDED ITS LOSS, BUT BRAD TAYLOR COULD NOT
A.

Centennial Bank could have avoided its loss by preparing and executing a
conveyance from G&L Mac, Inc in June 2006, but failed to.

Centennial readily admitted that it never prepared the necessary documents to obtain a deed
from G&L Mac, Inc. when it closed its loan to Gary McDonald. Centennial acknowledges that it
failed to prepare a document to gain title to the property in June 2006 (See Aff. of Cheryl Driscoll
ffi[19-20

and

Affi of Jane Stevensonffi}28and 32).

By so doing, the Plaintiff created the

circumstances that have led to its own loss* It was Centennial Bank that failed to obtain a
document attempting to secure G&L Mac Inc.'s property until December 22,2006. Centennial
Bank could have avoided this error, but failed to.
B.

Brad Taylor did what he could to avoid loss, now Centennial is attempting to
transfer the consequences of its own careless actions to Mr. Taylor.

Mr. Taylor instructed the title company that Taylor's lien had to be secured by the recording
of the Deed of Trust and Assignment of Rents before the money could be wired. See Taylor Aff.
Iflfl 1,16. Mr- Taylor had no way of knowing the First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah would
actually disburse the funds before recording his deed. He did all he could to preserve his rights as
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of June 1,2006. Upon learning who the true owner was, Mr. Taylor was thefirstparty to obtain a
trust deedfromG&L Mac, Inc. and record on September 6,2006. Id TJ23. As of September 6,
2006, Mr. Taylor was secured by a deed of trust from the true owner, and Centennial was several
months away from attempting to follow Mr. Taylor's lead and secure its position.
Centennial Bank on the other hand by its own admission failed to obtain a deedfromG&L
Mac, Inc. until December 22, 2006. Now Centennial Bank is cleverly trying to get ahead of Mr.
Taylor despite being months behind him in attempting to secure its interest with the true owner.
C.

Equity aids Brad Taylor for being vigilant and securing a deed from the
property owner, and not Centennial for letting more than 6 months elapse
before attempting to secure a deed from the property owner.

As Plaintiff points out in its opposition, equity aids the vigilant. Brad Taylor learned of an
error in his previous security and obtained a deed from G&L Mac, Inc. on September 5,2006,
which was recorded the following day. See Taylor Aff. ^23. Centennial on the other hand
executed its paperwork with Gary McDonald on June 2,2006, but failed to obtain a conveyance
document from G&L Mac, Inc. until more than six (6) months elapsed. Finally, after 'sleeping9 for
over a half a year, Centennial Bank sought out the real owner in interest to get a conveyance
document after the fact. It would appear that Mr. Taylor correcting his error in three months was
more vigilant than Centennial Bank, which failed to correct its error for almost seven months.
Indeed, equity should reward Mr. Taylor for his vigilance, and not punish him by allowing
Centennial to gain priority over him after ignoring its error for more than a half a year.
D.

Brad Taylor should be allowed to foreclose.

Plaintiff does not dispute that Mr. Taylor wasfirstto notice default on the property at issue
in this lawsuit. Plaintiff also does not dispute that Mr. Taylor should be allowed to foreclose the
property upon the Court's determination of priority.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein and in the memorandum in support of this motion, Brad Taylor
respectfully requests the Court grant his motion for partial summary judgment, declaring his
interest superior to that of Centennial Bank.
DATED this

7

day of June 2009.
Respectfully submitted,
W. Sean Mawhin£ey
Chad C Shattuck
Attorneys for Brad Taylor, and
Pro se as Trustee
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I am employed by Tycksen & Shattuck, L.C. and that I mailed a true
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Sherman C. Young
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1 MICHAEL WEES, LUCIA WEIS, LANE
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CONSTRUCTION, L-C, GARY
MCDONALD, G&L MAC, INC., RYAN
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INTRODUCTION
In this case, the priority of various interests and claims to real property located in
Riverton, Utah is before the Court. At present, the Court is considering the relative priority of
Plaintiffs Centennial Banlc and Richard. W. Jones's (hereinafter the "Banlc'3) deed of trust vis-avis the deed of trust of Defendant Bradford Taylor (hereinafter "Taylor"). On October 6,2009,
the Court entered a Memorandum Decision (the "Decision")- In the Decision, the Court denied
the Bank's and Taylor's cross-motions for summary judgment on the theory of equitable
subrogation. The Court also denied the Bank's motion for summary judgment on its claim of
reformation of the Special Warranty Deed, dated December 22, 2006. On November 6,2009,
Plaintiffs requested the Court to reconsider that part of the Decision. Finally, the Court
requested further briefing on Utah's After-Acquired Title and Race-Notice Recording statutes in
view of the recently reported case ofPremier Bankv. Bent County Comm 'rs9 214 P.3d 574
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(Colo. Ct. App. 2009). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs request the Court enter an order
decreeing that their deed of trust is the first and paramount deed of trust on the property.
This Court has indicated that the Premier Bank decision may be persuasive on the
question of the interplay between Utah's After-Acquired Title statute and Utah's Race-Notice
statute. Premier Bank is an unusual case because it involves the construction of the Colorado
After-Acquired hiterest statute, a statute that has existed unchanged on the books for nearly one
hundred fifty years and, previous to Premier Bank, had not seen the light of appellate discussion
in over eighty years. Premier Bank v. Bent County, 214 P.3d 574, 576 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
Given the dearth of guidance on the issue with which the Colorado Court of Appeals had to
work, the court provided several bases for its holding. Specifically, the Premier Bank court
founded its holding on the following: 1) Colorado's After-Acquired Interest statute does not
alter lien priority dates because that statute only addresses conveyances of fee title and is silent .
on the issue of lien priority; 2) in Colorado, deeds of trust create liens, and are not conveyances
of real property interests, making the After-Acquired Interest statute inapplicable to the deed of
trust in that case; and 3) the After-Acquired Interest statute did not apply because the quitclaim
deed at issue did not have warranties of title or purport to convey an interest in fee simple
absolute.
This Court has indicated that it finds the reasoning of Premier Bank persuasive, but
because neither party has had the opportunity to address the issue, the Court requested that the
parties brief the matter. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that a close comparison of Utah and
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Colorado law discloses that there are critical distinctions between our law and Colorado's that
undermine the persuasive authority ofPremier Bank's rationale. Furthermore, scrutiny of the
facts of this case and the facts of Premier Bank discloses that the two cases are factually
distinguishable in ways that also materially undermine the persuasive authority of the Premier
Bank rationale.
Preliminarily, Plaintiffs note that because discussion of after-acquired title necessarily
involves discussion of two different deeds, one of which is later in time and modifies the legal
effect of thefirst,it is helpful to have specific terms to distinguish between tire two deeds within
the After-Acquired Title analytical framework. Consistent with the rules of English grammar,
and rules of logic, for purposes of this memorandum, the term "Subject Deed" will be
understood herein to refer to the first deed executed by the purported grantee. In this case, the
Subject Deed is the June 2006 Deed of Trust executed by Gary McDonald in favor of Plaintiffs.
Likewise, for purposes of this memorandum, the term "Predicate Deed" will be understood to
refer to the deed that modifies the legal effect of the Subject Deed. In this case, the Predicate
Deed is the December 2006 Special Warranty Deed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH'S AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE STATUTE IN EFFECT IN 2006 GIVES
PRIORITY TO PLAINTIFFS' DEED OF TRUST.
A.

Utah is a Title Conveyance Theory State; Colorado is a Lien Theory State.

There is a fundamental difference between Utah's jurisprudence on deeds of trust as
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compared to Colorado's jurisprudence on the same subject. Specifically, Colorado is a "lien
theory" state, while Utah is a "title conveyance" theory state. Compare Hohn v. Morrison, 870
P.2d 513,516 (Colo. App. 1993) with General Glass Corp. v. Mast Construction Co., 766 P.2d
429,423 (Utah App. 1988). As explained in BA Properties Inc. v. Virgin Islands, 299 F.3d 207,
219 (3d Cir. 2002), in some states such as California, Georgia, Illinois, Virginia, Arkansas, and
West Virginia, a trust deed conveys title. Utah appears to be among the states that have adopted
this "title conveyance" theory for deeds of trust. See also First Sec 'y Bank v. Banberry
Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253,1256 (Utah 1989). Utah and California's positions are in contrast to
other western states including Colorado, Arizona, Washington, and Texas, which have adopted a
lien theory. See BA Properties, 299 F.3d at 219.
As explained in Faneuil Investors Group v. Board ofSelectmen ofDennis, 913 N.E. 2d
908, (Mass. App. 2009):
The basic divide between title and lien theory is whether a mortgage is considered a
conveyance of title. One of the crucial differences between lien and title theory is the
point at which title is considered to have passedfromthe mortgagor to the mortgagee,
respectively, at mortgage grant, or at foreclosure.
Therefore, under Colorado's lien theory, at the time of the initial execution and recording of a
deed of trust, the deed of trust only creates a lien and does not convey title. Title to the property
is not conveyed until foreclosure. In contrast, under Utah law, the initial execution and recording
of a deed of trust is a conveyance of title. Based in part upon this fundamental difference
between Colorado and Utah law, Plaintiffs submit that Premier Bank is not helpful in the Court's
consideration of the issues in this case.
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B.

Premier Bank Was Correctly Decided Under Colorado Lien Theory Law.

In PremierBank, the court answered the question of whether Colorado's After-Acquired
Interest statute is applicable to liens created by deeds of trust. Colorado's After-Acquired
Interest statute contemplates conveyance of real property. Premier Bank 214 P.3d at 576.
Nothing in the statute contemplates the legal effect of creating and granting a lien. Based on the
language of the statute, the court correctly concluded that the After-Acquired Title statute did not
apply to the deed of trust. Id. at 577-78. This is because in Colorado, giving a trust deed is not a
conveyance of title to property. Rather, it merely creates a lien against property. Id. Hence,
Colorado's After-Acquired Interest statute does not apply to deeds of trust.
C. Premier Bank Does Not Apply in Utah Because Utah is a Title Conveyance
State And Because Utah's After-Acquired Title Statute Specifically Contemplates
Conveyance of Title By Deed of Trust.
In contrast to Colorado, in Utah, giving a deed of trust does not create a lien, but rather is
a conveyance of title. First Sec'y Bank, 780 P.2d at 1256. This distinction is crucial to the
applicability of Utah's After-Acquired Title statute in this case because Subsection (2) of Utah's
version of the statute in effect in 2006 specifically contemplated conveyance of title by trust
deed:
(1) If any person conveys any real estate by conveyance purporting to convey the
same in fee simple absolute, and at the time of the conveyance the person does not
have the legal estate in the real estate, but afterwards acquires tire same:
(a) the legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the
grantee, the grantee's heirs, successors, or assigns; and
(b) the conveyance shall be as valid as if the legal estate had been in the
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. grantor at the time of the conveyance.
(2)(a) Subsection (1) applies to conveyance by:
(i) warranty deed;
(ii) special warranty deed; or
(iii) trust deed.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-10 (2006). Thus, as opposed to the situation in Premier Bank, where the
statutory language specifically excludedthe lien of a trust deed at issue from Colorado's AfterAcquired Interest statute, in the present case, the language of Utah's After-Acquired Title statute
specifically includes the trust deed presently at issue.
In sum, the Premier Bank court's analysis is as follows: in Colorado, trust deeds are not
conveyances of title. The After-Acquired Interest statute only contemplates conveyances of title.
The After-Acquired Interest statute in Colorado therefore does not encompass trust deeds.
This analysis cannot apply in Utah because in Utah, trust deeds are a conveyance of title.
Furthermore, Utah's After-Acquired Title statute in effect in 2006 specifically contemplated
conveyance of title by trust deed. That being the case, the 2006 version of the After-Acquired
Title statute does, on its plain language, apply to the present case.
D.
Utah's After-Acquired Title Statute Makes the June 2006 Deed of Trust in
the Present Case Effective as of June, 2006.
As discussed, the 2006 version of Utah's After-Acquired Title statute specifically
contemplates conveyance of title by trust deed. Utah Code Ann. § 57-l-10(2)(a)(iii) (2006).
Under the language of the statute, when a party conveys title to property that he does not own by
trust deed, but later comes into ownership of that property, title immediately passes to the
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grantee of the trust deed. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-10 (2006). Importantly, the mechanism by
which title passes is the Subject Deed. Id. More importantly, the law treats the Subject Deed "as
if the legal estate had been in the grantor at the time of the conveyance." Id.
In the present case,'the Subject Deed was a deed of trust executed by McDonald on June
2,2006. He did not own the property when he executed and delivered the June 2,2006 Deed of
Trust. McDonald subsequently came into ownership of the property on December 22,2006,
• through the Predicate Deed. When the Predicate Deed conveyed title of the subject property to
McDonald, title immediately passed to Centennial Bank by way of the June 2006 Deed of Trust.
This is because, the law treats the June 2006 Deed of Trust "as if the legal estate had been in
[McDonald] at the time of the conveyance." Id. Centennial therefore received legal title to the
property effective June 2,2006. That is, Centennial's priority date is June 2,2006.
E.
Notice Statute.

Utah's After-Acquired Title Statute Is In Harmony With Its Race-

From the language of Premier Bank at page 214 P.3d 579-80, cited by this Court in the
Decision, it appears that this Court is, as was the Colorado Court of Appeals, concerned with the
possibility that a senior interest in real property could be created by strangers to title without
putting the world on notice of this interest. The hypothetical risk would arise from the
application of Colorado's After-Acquired Interest statute in conjunction with Colorado's RaceNotice Recording Act. Under the hypothetical, two strangers to title could pull an end-around on
the Race-Notice statute by creating an interest in land that predated an interest that was created
by a then-existing land owner. Of primary concern is the observation by the Premier Bank court
that such an interest, 1) would be created without notice, 2) would relate-back to a time when
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neither stranger held an interest in the property and, 3) would have priority over any existing lien
created by the owner.
The following is a summary of the hypothetical presented by the Premier Bank court: A
gives B a lien on Black Acre and B records. A does not own Black Acre at the time A purports
to give B the lien. Later, 0 (owner of Black Acre) gives Z a perfected lien. Later still, 0
conveys Black Acre to A. The Premier Bank court noted that Colorado's After-Acquired
Interest statute would turn race-notice on its head if the After-Acquired Interest statute served to
give B's lien seniority over the Z's lien. Noting that it has an obligation to construe statutes
consistent with each other, the Premier Bank court refused to construe the After-Acquired
Interest statute and Race-Notice statute to lead to this contradictory result. Id. at 579-580.
i.

Colorado Is a Chain of Title Jurisdiction.

The Premier Bank court was correct that giving the Subject Deed priority in that case
would turn race-notice on its head in Colorado. This is because Colorado is a "chain of title"
jurisdiction. In chain of title jurisdictions, an instrument recorded outside of the chain of title is
treated as though it was never recorded at all. Collins v. Scott, 943 P.2d 20,23 (Colo. App.
1996); 12 Thompson on Real Property, Thomas Edition (David A. Thomas ed., 1994), § 92.07(d)
pp. 103-04. This is because in chain of title jurisdictions, the principal mechanism for
conducting title searches is the grantor-grantee indexes. Referring back to the Premier Bank
hypothetical, under Colorado law, when Z took his interest, Z had no way to know of the lien A
had given B because under a chain of title system, the instrument from A to B fell outside the
chain of title. A title searcher would only discover interests created by O, or O's predecessorsin-interest. At the time Z's interest was created, Z therefore was not on constructive notice of the
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A to B instrument. To subject Z's interest to B's lien would therefore turn Colorado's racenotice regime on its head, as the Premier Bank court noted.
ii.

Utah Is Not a Chain of Title Jurisdiction.

There is an important distinction between Colorado law and Utah law that would change
the outcome of the Premier Bank court's hypothetical if it were to occur in Utah. Utah is not a
chain of title jurisdiction. In Utah, county recorders maintain not only grantor-grantee indexes as
required in Colorado, but also tract indexes. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-21-6(a) - (f) (2009). If
the above-described hypothetical had occurred in Utah, Z would be on constructive notice of the
A to B instrument. This is because a reasonable title search would involve searching the tract
index. In a tract index, one would quickly find all instruments purporting to create an interest in
Black Acre. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-21 -6-(f). That would include the A to B instrument. In
Utah, therefore, giving the A to B instrument priority over the 0 to Z instrument would not turn
race-notice on its head. Indeed, it is entirely consistent with race-notice because any reasonable
title search would quickly find the A to B instrument.
Premier Bank is therefore not helpful on the question presently pending before this Court.
This is because the Premier Bank holding was based on notice within Colorado's chain of title
doctrine. Utah law regarding notice in this context is materially different than Colorado's.
Holding that the June 2, 2006 Subject Deed in favor of Centennial Bank is superior to the
September 22,2006 trust deed in favor of Taylor does not offend Utah's Race-Notice law. This
is because while a title search conducted in the grantor-grantee indexes in September of 2006
may not have disclosed the June 2,2006 Subject Deed, a reasonable search conducted in the tract
index would certainly have disclosed it. This is sufficient to put the world on notice of the
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contents of the June 2, 2006 Subject Deed. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102(1) (2009).l Taylor
was therefore on constructive notice of Centennial's June 2006 Deed of Trust when G&L Mac,
Inc. delivered his trust deed to him in September of 2006. Furthermore, it is undisputed that
Taylor was on actual laiowledge of Centennial's interest in the subject property. In short, giving
priority to the June 2006 Deed of Trust squares perfectly with principles of race-notice in Utah.
iii.

Affording Taylor A Priority Under These Facts Would Turn
Utah's Race-Notice Statute On Its Head.

Indeed, to hold otherwise would turn Utah's Race-Notice statute on its head. This is
because instead of establishing priority based upon who recorded first without notice or
laiowledge, the result would establish priority based upon who recorded first. In so doing, the
Court would write-out the ccNotice" aspect of the Race-Notice statute. The result would be a race
to the recorder's office. That is, whoever obtained a valid signature on a deed and recorded first
would have priority.
The Court may recall that Taylor'sfirstdeed of trust was executed by McDonald in his
individual capacity in June of 2006. This deed of trust wasflawedfor the same reason that the
Bank's deed of trust was flawed. Both were executed by McDonald when G&L Mac, Inc.
owned record title to the property. Taylor discovered the mistake and obtained and recorded the
September 2006 deed of trust, which is at issue in these motions. The title company discovered
the same mistake in the Bank's Deed of Trust and obtained and recorded the Special Warranty
Deed later, in December 2006. Under these facts, if the Court were to hold that Taylor's deed of
trust is entitled to priority over the Bank's deed of trust, it would conclude that Taylor is entitled
1

Plaintiffs also note that Taylor was on constructive notice from the time of "recording" of the June 2,2006 Deed of
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to priority because he recorded his September 5, 2006 deed of trust before the title company
obtained and recorded the Special Warranty Deed. That being the case, the Court would
necessarily conclude that the priority of the parties' deeds is controlled by who recorded first, not
based upon recording and the lack of knowledge or notice as required by statute.
iv.

Factual Distinctions Between the Present Case and Premier
Bank Satisfy the Demands of Race-Notice.

There is also a factual distinction between Premier Bank and this case that further
harmonizes Plaintiffs' present position with Utah race-notice principles. In Premier Bank, the
bank only had a lien on the husband's undivided one-half interest in the real property. As such,
when the county took its deed of trust on both the husband's and the wife's interests in the
property, due to Colorado's chain of title doctrine, the county had no constructive notice that the
bank claimed an interest in the wife's undivided one-half interest. This is clearly distinguishable
from the.facts of this case, where it is undisputed that Taylor had constructive notice of
Centennial's interest because the Deed of Trust was properly recorded on June 2,2006. Finally,
as noted above, Taylor acknowledged the Bank's interest in the Promissory Note dated
September 5,2006, evidencing that he was on actual notice of Centennial Bank's interest.
Under Utah law, therefore, concluding that Centennial Bank's June, 2006 Deed of Trust
is superior to Taylor's September, 2006 deed of trust by way of After-Acquired Title does not
offend Utah's Race-Notice regime. Indeed, in light of the constructive knowledge imparted by
recording and indexing of the June 2006 Deed of Trust, and in light of Taylor's actual
knowledge of the same on September 5,2006, Utah's Race-Notice statute dictates that Taylor's

Trust.

Page 13 of 15

interest is subject to Centenniars. See Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Wasatch Bank of
Pleasant Grove, 734 P.2d 904 (Utah 1986) (Utah recording act is "race-notice" statute which
requires lack of actual notice or prior recording for subsequent purchaser to prevail in multiple
conveyances of same land so that subsequent purchaser must show he had no actual notice prior
to conveyance or that prior conveyance did not impart constructive notice.).
POINT II
PREMIER BANK IS FURTHER DISTINGUISHED FROM THE CASE AT BAR
BECAUSE THE PREDICATE DEED IN THAT CASE WAS A QUITCLAIM DEED
WHICH DID NOT WARRANT AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE.
A further distinction exists between the facts of this case and Premier Bank. In Premier
Bank, the court construed the Subject Deed from the wife to the husband as a quitclaim deed.
Premier Bank, 214 P.3d at 578-79. It is well established in the law that the After-Acquired Title
doctrine does not apply to quitclaim deeds. Id. at 579. This is because quitclaim deeds do not
contain warranties of after-acquired title as do warranty deeds. Id.
However, in the case presently before this Court, the Predicate Deed at issue is the
December 22,2006 Special Warranty Deed. Unlike Colorado, Utah's After-Acquired Title
statute in effect at the time specifically applied to special warranty deeds. Utah Code Ana. § 571-10(2) (2006). 'Because of this distinction, the Premier Bank rationale is not helpful to this
Court in rendering its decision.
CONCLUSION
The rationale of Premier Bank does not apply in the present case. Premier Bank relied
on the fact that in Colorado trust deeds create liens on real property and that Colorado's AfterAcquired Interest statute was silent on the issue of lien priority. By way of contrast, in Utah trust
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deeds are a conveyance of title, and Utah's After-Acquired Title statute specifically contemplates
conveyance of title by trust deed. Additionally, Premier Bank and the present case are factually
distinguishable. Where the county in Premier Bankhad notice of the trust deed to the husband's
half interest only, in the present case, Taylor was on constructive and actual notice of Centennial
Bank's interest. Furthermore, the Premier Bank court's concerns were based on Colorado's
race-notice law. Colorado is a chain of title state. In contrast, Utah is not a chain of title state,
and its tract indexes render moot the Premier Bank court's concern that two strangers to title
could pull an end-around on the Race-Notice statute by creating an interest in land that predated
an existing interest that was created by a then-existing land owner. A search of the tract index
that county recorders are required by statute to maintain in Utah would quickly disclose the
interest created by strangers to title, thereby putting any subsequent takers on notice of this
interest.
None of the bases upon which the Premier Bank court relied apply in Utah. Utah's law is
different in every material respect from Colorado's such that the rationale upon which Premier
Bank was based cannot apply in Utah. At least as far as the issues currently pending in this
matter, Premier Bank is not helpful to this Court.
DATED this (/?

day of November, 2009.
fy submitted,

2RMAN C. YOUNG
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Centennial Bank, Inc.
Richard W. Jones, Trustee
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COMES NOW Bradford E Taylor, by and through his attorneys Tycksen & Shattuck, L.C.,
and respectfully presents this Supplemental Memorandum addressing the issue of after-acquired
title, in Support of Brad Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, as follows:1
SUMMARY
The text of § -57--1---10, Utah- law- case-law, and-authoritative-property treatises, are allhx
agreement that the after-acquired property doctrine passes only those property interests
subsequently obtained by the grantor, thus Brad Taylor ("Taylor") has a higher priority interest
than Centennial Bank ("Centennial"). U.C.A. § 57-1-10 passes after-acquired title to a grantee only
to the extent that the grantor actually subsequently acquires the same interests originally
purportedly granted by the grantor. In other words, the after-acquired titled doctrine does not
override the effect of the race-notice statutes. Gary McDonald ("McDonald") did not subsequently
acquire an.interest from G&L that is superior to that belonging to Taylor because G&L had already
conveyed, and Taylor perfected (by recording) his property interest months before G&L issued its
Special Warranty Deed to McDonald. Because McDonald could only convey the interest that he
actually acquired on December 22,2006, § 57-1-10 only authorizes Centennial Bank to obtain an
interest subject to Taylor's mortgage recorded on September 6,2006.
ARGUMENT
Under Utah's after-acquired title statute, U.C.A. § 57-1-10 (2006), the recording of the
Special Warranty Deed from G&L to McDonald on Dec. 22, 2006 did not give Centennial Bank
higher lien priority than Taylor because § 57-1-10 passed to Centennial only the "legal estate
subsequently acquired." Because the Deed of Trust from G&L to Taylor was recorded before the
Taylor incorporates by reference the undisputed facts cited in his memorandum in support of his motion for partial
summary judgment, but for the convenience of the Court does not restate them in this memorandum.
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Special Warranty Deed from G&L to McDonald, the "legal estate subsequently acquired" by
McDonald, and passed under § 57-1-10 to Centennial, comprised an interest subject to Brad
Taylor's recorded interest. Because the interest passed to Centennial was subject to a lien in
Taylor's favor, such interest did not and could not position Centennial as a higher-priority lien
holder over Taylor.
Utah Code § 57-1-10 passes an after-acquired property interest to a grantee only to the
extent of the grantor's later acquisition. The text of § 57-1-10, Utah case law, and generally
recognized understanding of the after-acquired property doctrine all limit after-acquired property to
the grantor's subsequently acquired interest.
A.

Because the text of § 57-1-10 limits after-acquired title to the grantor's
subsequently-acquired interest, the statute could not pass to Centennial a right
superior to Brad Taylor's interest because McDonald never acquired such an
interest.

§ 57-1-10 states, in pertinent part:
If any person conveys any real estate by conveyance purporting to convey the same in [trust deed],
and at the time of the conveyance the person does not have the legal estate in the real estate, but
afterwards acquires the same. .*. the legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to
the grantee.
U.C.A. §57-1-10(2006).
The qualifier, "legal estate subsequently acquired/' refers in plain English to the interest
that the grantor subsequently acquired, and not to the interest that the grantor purportedly conveyed
to the grantee before acquiring the interest. It is linguistically impossible tofindthat an interest not
subject to the Taylor lien was passed under § 57-1-10. Such a construction would require a rewrite
of the statute, e.g., replacing "subsequently acquired" with "purportedly conveyed." But this
amendment by itself would still fail to effectuate Centennial's desired outcome—"afterwards
acquires the same" must be amended to something more like: "afterwards acquires some of the
same." Without such changes to the language of the statute, § 57-1-10 would not vest in
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Centennial anything more than what Mr. McDonald received on December 22,2006 because
McDonald only acquired a legal interest in the subject property subject to the previously perfected
interest of Mr. Taylor.
The property interest at issue, the right to be the highest priority lien holder (or at least
higher than Taylor) was never "afterwards acquired" by McDonald because G&L did not have that
interest when the Special Warranty Deed to McDonald was recorded on Dec. 22,2006. While the
unambiguous text of § 57-1-10 may facilitate the passing of an interest in real property to
Centennial, the statute did not pass an interest superior to that held by Mr. Taylor because
McDonald never acquired such an interest.
B.

Utah case law holds that § 57-1-10 limits after-acquired title to the grantor's
subsequently acquired interest.

In applying the after-acquired title statute; the Utah Supreme Court's articulations and
paraphrasing of § 57-1-10 have been consistent with the statute's clear limitation of after-acquired
interests to the grantor's subsequently acquired interest in the property. '"The use of the warranty
deed in this case not only assured conveyance of all the vendors' current interest, but would also
automatically transfer to the grantees or their successors any "legal estate subsequently acquired."
Such is the effect of our statute, as well as the related doctrine of estoppel by deed.'" Arnold Indus.
v. Love. 63 P.2d 721, 726 (Utah 2002) (quoting Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224,228 (Utah 1983)
(emphasis added).2 "[Ejstoppel by deed operates only where the conveyance is intended to convey
a particular estate, which the grantor subsequently acquires." Dowse v. Kammerman, 246 P.2d
881, 882 (Utah 1952) (emphasis added).
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Arnold Indus, v. Love also confirms that the terms "estoppel by deed" and "after-acquired property" are
interchangeable: "[E]quitable doctrine of estoppel by deed [is] sometimes referred to as the doctrine of after-acquired
title." Arnold Indus, v. Love, 63 P.2d 721,726 (Utah 2002).
K

Utah case law follows the same reasoning the Court cited to in its Memorandum Decision
of October 6,2009, wherein it cited to the Colorado case: Premier Bank v. Board of County
Commas of Bent 214 P.3d 574 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). Just as stated in Premier Bank, Utah law
holds that the after-acquired-title doctrine can only serve to convey that which the grantor actually
subsequently acquires (see Dowse v. Kemmerman). To allow a more liberal construction of the
doctrine would indeed "not only turn the race-notice scheme upside-down, but also would be in
obvious conflict with other fundamentals of real estate law...." Premier Bank at 580.
C.

Property treatises also recognize that after-acquired property is limited to
interests subsequently acquired by the grantor.

In searching property treatises, Council for Taylor have not encountered (and suspect that
none exists) any characterization of the after-acquired title doctrine that would pass interests to the
grantee in excess of those interests subsequently acquired by the grantor. All such
characterizations that we have encountered use wording which is at least as explicit as § 57-1-10 in
limiting after-acquired property. "The after-acquired title doctrine states that title acquired by a
grantor, who previously attempted to convey title to land which the grantor did not in fact own,
inures automatically to the benefit of prior grantees." Thompson on Real Property, Thomas Edition
§ 82.11 (1994). Some characterizations are even more explicit: "[T]he doctrine can apply only to
such title as a grantor subsequently acquires; if his obligation relates to the entire fee and he
acquires a life estate only or merely a half interest, it is only these interest which can pass to his
grantee by inurement; if he acquires title subject to a mortgage to a third party, it would pass
in that form to his grantee." American Law of Property § 15.22 (Title by Estoppel), at 851,
(1952) (emphasis added).
Because the text of § 57-1-10, as well as Utah law and property treatises, are all in
agreement that the after-acquired property doctrine passes only property interests subsequently
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acquired by the grantor, Taylor has a higher lien*priority than Centennial; McDonald did not
subsequently acquire a first-position-priority interest from G&L because G&L had already
conveyed, and Mr. Taylor had already perfected (recorded) that property interest before G&L ever
conveyed the Special Warranty Deed to McDonald.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein and in the memorandum in support of this motion, Brad Taylor
respectfully requests the Court grant his motion for partial summary judgment, deny Centennial
Bank's motion and declare Brad Taylor's interest to be superior to that of Centennial Bank.
DATED this

V day of November 2009.
Respectfully submitted,
Chad C Shattuck
Attorneys for Brad Taylor, and
Pro se as Trustee
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NOTE SECURED BY DEED OF TRUST
(INDIVIDUAL)
$435,000.00
September 5/2006
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned jointly and severally, promise to pay to BRADFORD E, TAYLOR or
order, the principal sum of FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO/1 OOpayable as
follows:
ALL ACCRUED INTEREST AND PRINCIPAL SHALL BE DUE TWELVE (12) MONTHS FROM JUNE 1,2006.
A FEE OF ONE HUNDRED TEH THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($110,000:00) IS DUE AND PAYABLE TWELVE
(12) MONTHS FROM DATE OF THIS NOTE.
THIS NOTE SHALL BEAR AN INTEREST RATE OF ZERO (0) PERCENT PER ANNUM.
PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF ANY OF THE LOTS IN MCKENZIE PARK ESTATES SUBDIVISION SHALL BE
DISBURSED FIRST TO CENTENNIAL BANK, THEN ANY AND ALL REMAINING FUNDS SHALL'BE PAYABLE TO
BRADFORD E. TAYLOR.
Principal and interest payable in lawful money of tie United States of America.
If default occurs in the payment of any installment of principal or interest under this Note when .due; or in the
performance of any agreements contained in the Deed of Trust securing this Note, the entire principal sum and accrued
interest shall at once become due and payable, without notice, at the option of the holder of this Note. Failure to
exercise such option shall not constitute a waiver of the right to exercise it in the event of any subsequent default.'
The undersigned jointly and severally agree to pay the following costs, expenses and attorney's fees paid or incurred by
the holder of this Note, or adjudged by a court; (I) reasonable costs of collection, costs and expenses and attorney's
fees paid or incurred in connection with the collection of this Note, whether or not suit is filed, and (2) costs of suit and
such sum as the court may adjudge as attorney's fees in any action to enforce payment of this Note or any part of it
This Note is secured by a Deed of Trust to First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc., as Trustee, of even date
herewith, executed in favor of the named payee as beneficiary.
fhe undersigned jointly and severally waive presentment, notice of dishonorrnotice of protest, demand and diligence.

DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE
» Not Destroy this Original Note: When paid, this Original Note together with the Deed of Trust securing
ue, must be surrendered to Trustee for Cancellation and retention before reconveyance will be mark
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foregoing ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT FEDERAL
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION by placing two (2) true and correct copies of the
same in the U.S. Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Steven C. Tycksen
Chad C. Shattuck
W. Sean Mawhinney
TYCKSEN & SHATTUCK, LC
12401 South 450 East, Suite E-l
Draper, Utah 84020
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